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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I study market structure and incentives to innovate in the Norwegian 
music industry. The industry has gone through significant changes since the year 
2000. Every part of the value chain has been disrupted by technology, and the 
barriers to entry have decreased. However, major labels seem to have kept their 
market share. I define product and process innovation as respectively the release of a 
new artist and the release of a subsequent album. A product innovation gives the 
label the ability to release subsequent process innovations, which is needed for the 
label to recoup the investment of the product innovation. I demonstrate how market 
structure affects the incentives to invest in product and process innovation by using a 
logistic regression. My results show that independent labels invest two times more 
than major labels in product innovations. The objective for all labels is to release a 
product in the market with an innovative sound. The major labels will benefit from 
the first innovation by releasing multiple subsequent process innovations that allow 
them to benefit from diminishing cost. The independent label will release the first 
album, but cannot compete in the market for the second album because of lack of 
capital, less access to promotion channels and a small existing music catalogue. 
Competition in process innovations is too intense, so the independent labels will 
therefore continue to compete in product innovations by targeting the subculture 
and re-segmenting their portion of the market while major labels reap the larger 
benefits from process innovations, which maintains their market share. 
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Preface 
The thesis is written as part of the Double Degree programme between the 
Norwegian School of Economics and Louvain School of Management.  
 
The music industry is interesting to study. Despite its relatively small size, it affects 
almost all consumers in some way. The last thirteen years have changed the entire 
value chain and forced labels to rethink their existence. It is important for me study 
an area that catches my interest. Music has always been a passion of mine, and I 
therefore decided to study how innovation was affected by the market structure in 
the industry.  
 
The research question is ambitious and comprehensive. I have applied non-
traditional methods to define and measure innovation. This has made the work 
challenging, but also very interesting. I would like to thank the executives at 
Universal Music Norway and EMI Music Norway for allowing me to interview them, 
Gramo for providing me with information on album releases, Rockipedia for 
granting me access to their music database, and TONO for the preliminary 
interviews about the music industry. 
 
At last, I would like to thank my supervisors, Sven A. Haugland at the institute for 
Strategy and Management at the Norwegian School of Economics, and Paul 
Belleflamme at Louvain School of Management for their feedback and support, 
helping me to refine the research question and guiding me in the right direction. 
 
 
 
Andreas Prestegaard Engstrand 
Brussels, June 19th, 2013 
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Terminology: 
Record label: A firm that coordinates the production, distribution, marketing and 
promotion of recorded music 
 
Major label: A record label that owns its own distribution facilities 
 
Independent label (“Indie”): An independent label that distributes music through a 
major’s distribution system or through an independent distribution facility 
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1 Introduction 
-.- /"0123'4*5&
Incentives to innovate and market structure are closely related. As intensity 
increases, firms are more likely to undertake product innovations to flee competition. 
If differentiation is already high, firms prefer to undertake process innovations. 
Decreasing profits and increasing number of record labels summarize the last 13 
years of the music industry. Music revenues have hit the bottom and are finally 
starting to increase, thanks to the labels’ embrace of digital technology. Since the 
golden age in the late 90s, the Norwegian industry revenues have dropped from 980 
million NOK to 389 million NOK in 2012 (IFPI, 2013a), and the industry blames 
illegal file sharing. The subject has raised debates among researchers, musicians, and 
the industry itself. Everyone has an opinion about the trend. The effect of file sharing 
is rather ambiguous, although the companies in the industry tried to protect 
themselves by filing lawsuits against music consumers, hoping that file sharing 
would dwindle. It did not. While labels had the opportunity to develop a new 
distribution service that met the demand of their consumers, they did not. As the 
labels were busy suing their consumers, Apple launched its iTunes Music Store in 
2003, capturing a significant portion of the digital market they could have secured 
themselves. But it was when Spotify launched its service in the American market that 
the global revenues stopped decreasing. The labels’ problem was that they now had 
given away the very profitable distribution chain.  
 
The last thirteen years have disrupted every part of the record industry’s value chain: 
creation, production, reproduction and distribution. The changes have forced firms 
out of business, consolidation of the major labels, but also opened up for new firms 
to enter the mature music market. Digital technology has decreased the barriers to 
entry, but the profit distribution from digital music services has increased the 
importance of economies of scale. There were released 935 Norwegian albums in 
2000, but 1324 in 2012. If we include the numbers for digital releases, the supply has 
increased from 986 to 1847. A simple calculation of the average revenue per album 
using the total industry sales shows that the average revenue has decreased from 197 
676 NOK in 2003 to 84 178 NOK in 2012. When accounting for the market share for 
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major and independent labels, the distribution of revenues is probably much 
different. On an international level, the market share of the major labels has 
decreased from 2010 to 2011. Interestingly, the artist Adele takes much of the credit. 
She was one of the most successful artists in 2010 and signed to an independent 
label. Independent labels’ market share increased from 23,2% in 2010 to 25,2 
percent in 2011 (Musicandcopyright, 2012). Nevertheless, the major labels still hold a 
significant market share. This is not necessarily negative. According to Schumpeter 
(1942), monopolists are better positioned than firms in perfect competition to 
undertake investments in research and development (R&D) because they have the 
economies of scale and significant knowledge of the market. Arrow (1976), however, 
believes firms in perfect competition have larger incentives to innovate than 
monopolists, as investing in products that give them exclusive rights of use generates 
relatively larger profits compared to the situation in perfect competition.  
 
I demonstrate that independent labels release two times more product innovations 
than major labels. Innovation in the music industry is investing in new albums from 
existing artists or new artists. Investing in subsequent albums of existing artists is 
defined as process innovation whereby investing in new artists is defined as product 
innovation. Investing in an album gives the label exclusive rights to sell and 
distribute the album, thus giving the label monopoly power in the market for each 
album. I will use a list of all Norwegian releases since 2000. I will look at the 
evolution in product versus process innovations and how the type of label affects the 
supply of the different types of innovation. I have interviewed artist and repertoire 
executives (A&R) in two major labels in the Norwegian music industry in order to get 
a more detailed picture of the dynamics between major and independent labels as 
well as the investment process in the labels.  
 
 &
 10 
-.6 7%,%"308&94%,+:'*&
The music industry is very appealing for me because I have a passion for music as 
well as working experience in artist management. When I followed the course 
“Economics of Innovation” with professor Paul Belleflamme at Louvain School of 
Management, I came up with my research question. The course challenges students 
on topics within economic analysis of intellectual property, R&D, and innovation. 
The course concentrates primarily on information goods and knowledge, and I was 
especially interested in the relationship between market structure and incentives to 
innovate. I asked myself whether I could study how market structure affects 
incentives to innovate in the music industry, which led me to the following research 
question: 
 
How can market structure explain the incentives to innovate in the 
Norwegian music industry? 
 
I will try to answer the research question by answering the following sub-questions: 
How can we define innovation in the recording industry? 
What is the market structure of the Norwegian recording market? 
How has the market structure been affected by technological changes? 
How is the innovation behavior of today’s labels? 
 
-.; <#=%0+:>%,&'(&+8%&!8%,:,&
I have chosen to study the Norwegian record market because it is one of the pioneer 
markets in digital music distribution (Dredge, 2013). While other music markets still 
rely mostly on physical sales, digital sales are the primary source of income in the 
Norwegian market. The recording industry is interesting to study because the 
products they produce take part of consumers’ everyday life. The digitization of the 
industry has disrupted every part of the value chain, forcing the labels to rethink how 
they produce and distribute music. The objective of the thesis is to understand the 
importance of the different roles of the Norwegian record labels. Mapping the 
behavior of the record labels can help us understand the impact created by the 
different labels. We may gain insight on what labels focus on product innovations 
whereas others focus on process innovations. I will look into the different labels, the 
 11 
competition among the labels, the business model of the labels and the technological 
development in the market.  
 
 
-.? @+340+43%&
In this chapter, I have introduced the research question and the research design. In 
the next chapter, I will introduce the market and the market structure for recorded 
music in Norway. I will look at the players in the market as well as the value chain of 
the record industry. In Chapter 3, I will present the theoretical framework in the 
thesis. I start by defining what innovation is. I will then present different theories 
explaining how market structure affects innovation. Chapter 4 presents the research 
model. Chapter 5 presents the methodology of the thesis, Chapter 6 presents the 
results and analysis. Chapter 7 presents the discussion of the results and Chapter 8 
contains the conclusion.  
 
APA 6th edition referencing has been used throughout the thesis. 
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2 The Music Industry 
6.- !8%&A4,:0&B*54,+3C&
The music industry consists of several sectors. When we talk about the record 
industry, it is easy to talk about it as the music industry. However, the record 
industry only represents a small portion of the total revenue in the industry. The live-
market, promotion market and publishing market are large markets that collect 
significant revenues every year. These markets, and especially the live-market, have 
become more important as the record industry’s profits have decreased (Connolly & 
Krueger, 2006). One reason we talk about the record industry as the music industry 
is because the record industry has been the gatekeeper for producing the world’s 
most famous celebrities; and it still is. Of the top ten most followed Twitter accounts 
worldwide, eight out of ten are music artists (Twitter.com, 2013). This thesis will 
concentrate on the Norwegian market for recorded music. By Norwegian, I mean the 
production, distribution and consumption of Norwegian artists by Norwegian 
consumers. Music is an international product, but most music is consumed locally (J 
Waldfogel & Ferreira, 2010). Very few artists appeal to a large international 
population. Most Norwegian artists concentrate on a Norwegian audience. The same 
applies for South Africa, Germany or France. “Competition in most of the media 
industry’s different segments is national or language specific. The different markets 
are characterized by strong competition with continuously shifting market shares” 
(Dimpfel, Habann, & Algesheimer, 2002, p. 267). Even with the increased simplicity 
of distributing music across borders, Waldfogel et al. (2010) have found no evidence 
that new communication channels reduce the consumption of domestic music. 
Recent numbers from IFPI1 on the Norwegian market support this argument (see 
Figure 1). In fact, the share of domestic music has actually increased with the shift to 
digital distribution from 22,3% in 2003 to 36,2% in 2012 (IFPI, 2013a). Every 
country has its own type of music, which is formed through culture and language. 
With digital distribution, any artist is more or less available in every country, but 
consumer preferences remain the same. 
                                                   
1 The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) represents the recording industry 
worldwide. IFPI promotes the members interests by coordinating strategies within anti piracy, 
lobbying, litigation and public relations. They also publish comprehensive global statistics on the 
industry (IFPI, 2013b). 
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Figure 1 Domestic vs International music sales in Norway. Source: IFPI.no (2013) 
 
 
6.6 !8%&7%0'35:*2&B*54,+3C&
The Norwegian record industry is relatively small. The yearly turnover for the 
industry was 379 million NOK in 2012 (IFPI, 2013a). If the live market is included, 
the turnover is significantly higher. The live market is not part of this study, but the 
two markets are naturally closely related. As the record industry has survived severe 
structural changes since the year 2000, the live market has become more important 
for artists than it was before. In an interview with the NRK (Norwegian Broadcasting 
Corporation), a Norwegian artist said “In the 90s, we played concerts to promote 
CDs; today we sell music to promote our concerts” (Hofseth, 2009). Ticket revenues 
seem to have replaced the position of record revenues for artists. However, the 
record industry is still important, as it represents the investors for an artist’s career. 
 
 
There are four large producers in the record industry and hundreds of small 
producers. The record industry is an oligopoly (Hutchison, Allen, & Macy, 2010). I 
will explain this classification further in Chapter 6. An oligopoly is a market structure 
defined by a few producers that compete on price or quantity with homogenous or 
differentiated products (Krugman & Wells, 2008). The record industry is a mature 
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market characterized by a fixed number of producers, lack of innovation , and slow
growth. We distinguish between two types of record producers: Major labels
(“majors”) and independent labels (“indies”). A major is originally defined as a label
that owns its own distribution channel (Knab, 2010). An independent label is defined
as a label that is not affiliated with a major label and that distributes its music
through alternative distribution networks (Knab, 2010) . From 1980 until today, the
record industry has gone through several mergers, resulting in four major labels
which control as much as 80 percent of the worldwide market for recorded music
today (Hutchison et al., 2010). We will give a brief description of the four major
labels.
Figure 2 Market shares international record labels. Source: Hutchison, Allen & Macy 2010
Universal Music Group (UMG) is the largest of the four labels, representing
around 30% of the total market share. The label comprises more than 20 labels, such
as Def Jam, Motown, Island Records, Lost Highway Records, MCA Nashville,
Mercury Records,Polydor Records,Universal Music Latino , and Verve Music Group.
It represents artists such asU2, Rolling Stones,Lady Gaga,Eminem, Odd Nordstoga,
Jarle Bernhoft and A-ha (Universalmusic.no, 2013).
Warner Music Group (WMG) is one of the oldest music labels, and is listed on
the New York Stock Exchange(NYSE.com,2013). WMG was purchased by a group of
private investors from AOL – Time Warner. Asylum, Atlantic, Nonesuch, Fueled and
Warner Bros are some of the labels under Warner’s umbrella. Warner recently
bought a share of EMI Music from Universal Music, the label Parlophone Label
Group (Sisaro, 2013). Warner represent artists such as Josh Groban, Linkin Park,
Red Hot Chili Peppersand Muse (Music, 2013)
15
Entertainment Music Industries (EMI) is the smallest label of the big four.
Their story stretches back to 1887 (Emimusic.com, 2013), and in Norway they hold
the rights to the first Norwegian record ever produced (Savio, J. pers. comm., 11
April 2013). EMI is the home of the sub levels such as Blue Note and Virgin. The
artist rooster contains among other the Beatles,Coldplay, Pink Floyd, Kylie Minogue
and Norah Jones. The firm was once listed on the New York Stock Exchange,but the
label faced financial distress and was acquired by Citigroup in 2011(Perpetua, 2011).
Recently, EMI was acquired by Universal Music but had to sell a division within EMI
in order to get the approval from the European Commission (Vivendi.com, 2013).
Sony Music Entertainment (SME) is the second largest record label. They
represent artists such as Alicia Keys, Paul Simon, Michael Jackson and Ke$ha. They
are home to several labels: Columbia Nashville, Epic Records, RCA Records, Legacy
Records, and Masterworks. The company was founded in 1991by Sony Corporation
America (a subsidiary of Sony Corporation), which bought the famous CBSRecords
(Sony, 2013). SME later merged with Bertelsmann Music Group in 2004, which was
at the time the fifth major record label (Sony, 2013).
The number of major labels has decreased as a result of the consolidation in the
industry . EMI Music has been sold and split between the three other majors, but I
will treat it as separate unit in line with the other three as the merger is not yet
initiated.
Table 1 Number of firms, employees and labour productivity in EU 27 music industry, 1997-2007.
Source: Leurdijk & Nieuwenhuis, 2011
Independent Labels
Independent labels hold the last portion of about 25 percent of the market. The
definition of an independent label is however unclear. Some labels have several
employees and have operations in several countries while others are self-employed
Number of firms, employees and labour
productivity in EU 27 music industry, 1995-2007
6
October 26, 2011
Andra Leurdijk Music industry - a case study
1995 2007
Number of firms 4,982 11,833
Number of employees 15,407 21,023
Average number of employees
per firm
3,09 1,78
Labour productivity 44,8 67,3
Source: Eurostat
Labour productivity is the amount of goods and services that a worker
produces in a given amount of time.
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one-man labels. Table 1 lists the increase in the number of employees and firms in 
the European music market. The number of firms in the music industry has more 
than doubled from 1997 to 2005 while the number of number of employees per firm 
has almost reduced by a half. Note that this is the number for the music industry, 
and not the record industry but the trend in Norwegian market is the same. The 
numbers is this paper show that in 2000, there were 361 labels that released at least 
one album. In 2012, the number had increased to 569. A list of the Norwegian 
independent labels can be found in appendix 0. We will give an introduction to the 
history of the industry before we present the value chain and then the theoretical 
framework. The history shows how technology has shaped the industry from the 
beginning of the 1900 until today. 
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The history of the record industry starts at the end of the 19th century in New York. 
History shows that file sharing is by far the only innovation that disrupted the 
industry’s business model. The area of Tin Pan Alley in New York was the gathering 
place for composers, lyricists, music publishers, and talent scouts. The block on 28th 
Street between Broadway and 6th Avenue assembled the epicenter of songwriting and 
music publishing in New York (“Tin Pan Alley: 1880-1953,” n.d.). Among the 
composers from Tin Pan Alley, we find names such as Irving Berlin, George 
Gershwin, and Cole Porter (Hofseth, 2011), whose songs can be found in any Jazz 
Standard book. The cluster of different players in the popular music industry 
encouraged collaboration, which has resulted in many of the most popular songs in 
the American popular music history. Sheet music had increased in popularity 
because of the introduction of the piano in middle class family homes. This was the 
start of the publishing industry, an important part of the music industry that has 
become extremely profitable in recent years.  
 
As the radio and recorded music gained importance during the 1920s, artists’ 
interpretations of songs became more important than sheet music. With increasing 
popularity for recorded music, composers at Tin Pan Alley lost their position in the 
market, replaced by the new record labels. The industry was in its initial steps and 
the business model of the music industry we know today was established. Artists 
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gave firms the copyright of their work in return for a salary. They had created an 
industry that sought to gain profit on artists that wanted to become popular. Record 
technology was not well developed at the time. The major record labels we know 
today have their roots from this period. The first record manufacturers were Victor 
and Columbia (both taken over by Sony). They had no technology for copying records 
so several phonographs were lined up in the studio while the band was playing. One 
can imagine how many times each album had to be played. There was no exclusivity 
between the labels. Each artist could choose what label to work with. The more 
successful labels ensured to get deals with the most attractive artists. They were 
sometimes paid more than what the labels would manage to make on the record, but 
records were considered a long-term investment, since the rights to the music 
belonged to the labels (Hofseth, 2011).  
 
Different record formats were developed with ambiguous success. It was first with 
the introduction of the vinyl-player in the early 60s that the sales took off (Hofseth, 
2011). Music was at the time released as singles with one hit-song and an additional 
song on the B-side of the record. Once the LP record that allowed artists to put more 
songs into a record was released, artists could release more songs that would not 
have been profitable enough to be sold alone. Artists had discovered the economics 
of bundling. The album had several advantages. Labels could charge a higher price 
because it contained several songs. Furthermore, economies of scale allowed labels to 
gain on distribution and marketing, as the cost of marketing and distribution per 
song was lower for album songs than for single songs (Hofseth, 2011). Investors 
opened their eyes for the profitability of the industry and levered the operations for 
international expansion. The record was not longer the only product, but also the 
shows for promotion and merchandise (Smith, 2012). 
 
The introduction of the cassette is referred to as “the Internet of the 70’s” (Hofseth, 
2011, sec. 9). Cassettes were small in size and allowed consumers to easily copy 
albums or make mix tapes of their favorite songs. The cassette was the first 
democratization of music publishing and music listening and they were much 
cheaper to produce than the vinyl albums. People could bring the music anywhere 
with the portable Walkman. The record industry was not happy, as people could copy 
cassettes rather than buy them. This led to several campaigns against home copying 
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and resulted in the Norwegian Parliament imposing an additional tax on every empty 
cassette to outweigh the private copying, according to the Norwegian Parliament (St. 
Meld. 2, 1988). 
 
In the mid 1980s, the Compact Disc (CD) was released. The CD had the same 
robustness as the cassette, but did not have all the noise and crackling. It quickly 
became the preferred music format for its convenience and quality. Record labels 
embraced the CD, and record sales peaked during this period, which lasted until the 
beginning of the millennium. Consumers were not entirely happy though, as copying 
a CD seemed more difficult than with cassettes. People had become used to creating 
mix tapes and sharing their favorite albums with friends. The CD missed an 
important factor. The CD burner was the product that would change that (Knopper, 
2009). The labels had fought against copying since the cassette, but fighting the CD 
burner seemed tougher. During the late 90s, the software industry was on its way up. 
Sony had a foot in both industries. The CD burner was very important for the 
software industry. Although it allowed people to make illegal copies of software 
products, the software industry would not agree to stop the development of the CD 
burner, so Sony had no choice. Without Sony on their side, the other labels could not 
fight the battle alone (Knopper, 2009). They had to find other ways to fight illegal 
copying. The CD burner could potentially disrupt their extremely profitable business 
model. So they invented the DRM. 
 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) is software included on CDs that prevented 
people from copying it (Layton, 2013). The copy protection makes it impossible for 
users to copy CD’s. Such protection is still in use today by several firms to control the 
circulation of illegal copies. However, the first protections were easy to circumvent. 
With the launch of Napster, DRM had little effect. 
 
Napster 
Napster made big changes in the music industry. It disrupted the record labels’ 
business model and represents the beginning of the shift towards digital distribution 
of music. It is referred to as the David vs. Goliath battle, and the consumers gathered 
around Napster to support its existence (Knopper, 2009). Sean Fanning and Shawn 
Parker launched Napster in 1999. It was established as a company in 1999 with 
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Fanning’s uncle as CEO. His uncle was an entrepreneur who never really succeeded 
with his inventions. But at the time Napster was launched, Fanning was still in 
college and needed someone with knowledge on how to run a company to help him 
get connections. Napster was not the first service that allowed people to share music 
online. People had already put up several sites with their music collection. But the 
convenience of Napster quickly attracted thousands of users. Napster became known 
in the industry and was approached by several venture capitalists (Knopper, 
2009).Eileen Richardson, partner at JK&B Capital in Chicago joined the executive 
board of Napster and initiated contact with the five largest record labels at the time 
(Knopper, 2009). Napster’s history is well known. It ended with several lawsuits 
from the major record labels and went bankrupt. However, Napster could have been 
the optimal solution to fight piracy at the time. Napster had meetings with all the 
major labels, trying to establish a business model that the labels and Napster could 
agree upon. Although this was new to the labels, they were not as reluctant as the 
history says. There were several deal proposals on the table for the majors investing 
in Napster, but the problem was stubbornness on both sides that resulted in the 
labels walking away (Knopper, 2009). Instead of investing in a service with 30 
million users, the labels left “billions and billions of dollars on the table by suing 
Napster (…) It was the moment that the record labels killed themselves”, says Jeff 
Kwatinetz, chief executive officer of the Firm1 (Knopper, 2009, p. 143). The RIAA2 
tried to maintain a good image of the industry by telling that file sharing was stealing 
(Knopper, 2009). Many of them hoped that file sharing would go away when the 
lawsuit concluded and they could continue with the profitable CD sales. It took as 
long as three years from Napster’s beginning until the record labels signed the first 
legal contract with a digital downloading service.  
 
Steve Jobs launched the iTunes Apple Store in 2003. Labels spent most of their time 
trying to fight illegal file sharing services instead of building a new way to distribute 
music online. At the time, people had gotten used to digital downloading. Jobs 
                                                   
1 The Firm is a management company in Los Angeles representing artists like Korn, Linkin Park, 
Mandy Moore and Ice Cube (Knopper, 2009) 
2 Recording Industry of America (RIAA) is the trade organisation that represents the major record 
labels in the record industry. RIAA works to protect intellectual property rights, monitor and review 
relevant laws and perform research about the industry (RIAA, 2013). 
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presented to the labels a service that allowed people to download every song they 
wanted (Knopper, 2009). It was legal and included DRM copy protection to prevent 
people from copying the downloaded songs. The labels knew they had no other 
choice than to agree (Knopper, 2009). People were still buying CDs, but downloading 
was an increasing trend they could not turn around, as new illegal file sharing 
services were established right after Napster was shut down. They had spent the last 
three years suing their consumers instead of offering a legal alternative to file 
sharing. The labels jumped on the boat, but left the previously profitable distribution 
behind. Apple captured that part of the value chain.  
 
To summarize the historical view of the record industry, the labels have gone through 
several disruptive phases. None of the new product introductions have been 
launched without some obstacles. Radio and records disrupted the profitable 
publishing industry in the 1920s. The cassette democratized people’s listening habits 
and allowed consumers to copy their albums. The industry responded by introducing 
a tax on every blank cassette sold. The industry tried to introduce a similar tax on 
blank CDs when the CD burner was launched, but it never went through. The 
industry answered to digital technology by suing their consumers for sharing files 
online rather than develop a legal service to profit on the digital trend. The history 
has affected every part of the value chain, which we will give a closer look.  
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Digital technology has changed the original value chain of the industry. The value 
chain describes a chain of activities performed by a firm that is linked to the 
competitive position of the firm (Porter, 1985). I have split the value chain in four 
major parts: Discovering talent, production, Distribution, and Marketing and Sales. 
The four chain links have all been affected by technology. I will therefore present 
both the old and the new value chain and highlight the differences. 
 
The traditional value chain is denoted as the “analogue” value chain, and the new 
value chain is denoted as “digital”. The analogue value chain was fixed and all the 
steps were performed by the label. In order to release an album, artists had to go 
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through all steps of the value chain to release an album. The digital value chain 
allows artists to perform some of the steps on their own or with another partner.  
 
 
Discovering Talent 
The first step is the creation phase, where labels discover artists and the artists write 
songs. In the analogue model, labels received demo tapes from artists. If they 
received something they liked, they went to see the artist perform live. 
 
The digital chain has made it easier for labels to discover new artists, as they upload 
their content via Youtube or Soundcloud. It has also increased the number of artists 
who approach labels. Technology can give labels a better picture of the quality of the 
artist, but the industry stress the importance of watching artists perform live (IFPI, 
2012). 
 
Production 
Once the artist has signed a contract, they join the label’s artist pool. There were 
three types of record contracts under the analogue model: Artist contract, licensing 
contract and distribution contract (Savio, 2013).  
 
Artist Contract 
In an artist contract, the label pays for all the costs related to the album release: 
Recording, production, marketing, and promotion. The label gets full rights to the 
album, and artists will get return from the sales when the entire investment is 
recouped. In return for giving away the ownership, the artist gets an advance 
payment.  
 
Licensing 
Under licensing contracts, the artist licenses the album to the record label. The artist 
may have financed the recording and production of the album and the rights belong 
to the artist, but the label takes care of marketing, sales, and promotion. Artists are 
given an advance payment also in these contracts. 
 
Distribution 
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The third type is distribution. In this case, the label only ensures the album is 
available in store. The label markets the album to the distributors and the stores, but 
is not involved in promotion and marketing of the album.  
 
Contracts under the digital chain are more flexible. They can be hybrid versions of 
the models above. They are no longer written in stone, as neither artists nor labels 
want to sign a contract with each other for a too long period (Savio, 2013) 
 
Promotion and Sales 
Promotion involves contacting radio stations, arranging interviews with journalists, 
TV performances, and concerts before a release. Internet has made it easier to 
promote an artist to a larger audience, but there are also more people competing for 
consumers’ attention. Marketing in the analogue model meant expensive radio and 
TV commercials and marketing through posters and product placement in record 
stores. It required large investments to make an artist succeed. Labels rarely do TV 
commercials for album releases anymore. Most marketing is done through digital 
advertising and promotion has become more important (Savio, 2013) 
 
Distribution 
Once a release is produced, labels distribute the album through their distribution 
network or through another distributor. The physical distributor distributes the 
album to record stores, grocery stores and any other store where they sell music 
records. The digital distributor delivers to several digital aggregators, such as 
streaming services, downloading services and mobile phone companies that allow 
song to be downloaded to mobile phones. Digital distribution has decreased the fixed 
and marginal cost of music. There are no longer any reproduction costs or storage 
costs of music in the digital distribution chain.  
 
Today’s value chain is a hybrid of the analogue and the digital chain. Since CDs and 
physical products are still produced and represent an important part of the music 
revenues, the analogue distribution is still present, but the digital distribution is 
becoming more and more important.  
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3 Theory 
The theoretical framework stems from the field of Industrial Organization. 
Innovation is the dependent variable of my study while the independent variable is 
market structure. I will start this chapter by introducing different definitions on 
innovation. I will then introduce the market structures monopoly, oligopoly, and 
perfect competition and demonstrate how they are linked to innovation. Finally, I 
will look at how the different market structures affects the incentives to innovate.  
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Innovation has many definitions. The definitions that will follow describe innovation 
through the impact it creates for the innovator or for the society. “Innovation is the 
generation, development and adaption of an idea or behavior, new to the adopting 
organization” (Damanpour, 1996). Schumpeter emphasized the entrepreneurial side 
of innovation, defining it as the “introduction of new products, new means of 
production or new forms of organisation” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 82).  Innovations 
can be continuous incremental advances in technology that slowly replace existing 
technology, or they may be discontinuous (also known as radical): “a major 
technological change resulting in the creation of a technology for a particular 
industry” (Hamilton & Singh, 1992, p. 15). The latter has a much greater impact on 
the market. These definitions focus on the introduction of something new, original or 
improved, may it be a product or a production method. Others put more emphasis on 
the value created by innovations. An innovation affects not only the innovator, but 
also its surroundings. “Innovation is conceived as means of changing an 
organization, either as a response to changes in the external environment, or as a 
pre-emptive action to influence the environment” (Damanpour, 1996). Barack 
Obama defined it as “the creation of something that improves the way we live our 
lives” (Nussbaum, 2007). The social surplus of an innovation can be derived 
depending on the type of innovation. Brown’s (2003) (as cited in Assink, 2006, p. 
218) definition of innovation includes all the aspects of innovation that we will cover 
in this thesis. “An innovation is a successfully exploited radical new product, process, 
or concept that significantly transforms the demand and needs of an existing market 
or industry, disrupts its former key players and creates whole new business practices 
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or markets with significant societal impact.” The latter definition covers the areas of 
innovation that will be explored in this thesis. The next section will describe the 
different types of innovation. 
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I will first introduce the two types of innovation that is normally used in the 
literature of Industrial Organization: Process innovation, as I have defined as the 
introduction of new albums to the market; and product innovation, as I have defined 
as the introduction of new artists to the market. Process and product innovation will 
be used as a terminology for the release of albums and release of new artists. The last 
type of innovation is disruptive innovation.  
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Innovation can be defined along two dimensions: the internal dimension and the 
external dimension (Scocco, 2013). A process innovation is “the generation and 
introduction of a new production process” (Belleflamme & Peitz, 2010, p. 481). A 
new process allows firms to decrease the marginal cost of production and reap the 
profit generated by the increased difference between price and marginal cost. The 
reason firms innovate can be explained through the accumulation of knowledge they 
acquire by operating in an industry. Process innovations often build on the existing 
knowledge within the firm. As firms operate in the market, they capture information 
about the market and its consumers, allowing them to perform more precise 
innovations that increase the quality of the products offered. Firms gather 
information about how consumers use their products, where they use it and what 
they believe the products are missing. The external dimension involves modest 
changes in technology in the market, and innovations are often upgrades of existing 
products. Any electronic producer can be used as an example for this dimension. 
Samsung releases new mobile phone upgrades twice a year with small technological 
upgrades. Process innovations are less risky than product innovation that we will 
introduce later. “Incremental innovation development remains within the 
boundaries of the existing market and technology or processes of an organisation 
and carries lower financial and market-acceptance risks” than radical innovations 
(Assink, 2006, p. 217).  
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Process innovations can be further classified in two groups according to their impact 
on market structure: drastic innovation and non-drastic innovation (Belleflamme & 
Peitz, 2010). A drastic innovation reduces the marginal cost of a product to the 
extent that it creates a monopoly where the monopoly price is below the marginal 
cost of the competitors. This gives the innovator monopoly power. Non-drastic 
innovations reduce the marginal cost for the innovator compared to its competitors, 
giving the innovator a competitive advantage in production (Belleflamme & Peitz, 
2010).  
 
The incentive to innovate is defined as the difference in profits before and after the 
innovation (Helmers, 2009).  
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Leifer (2001) (as cited in Assink, 2006, p. 218) defines product innovation as “a 
product, process or service with either unprecedented performance features or 
familiar features that offers significant improvements in performance or cost that 
transform existing markets or create new ones.” Product innovation can be classified 
along the two dimensions we used above. Along the internal dimension, radical 
innovations require new knowledge or complete replacement of existing knowledge 
in order to release a new innovation. On the external dimension, radical innovations 
will introduce large technological advancements, in some cases creating substitutes 
of the existing technology or in other cases making existing technology obsolete. 
Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) demonstrate that product innovation is only an 
extreme form of process innovation. If we assume the product already existed in the 
market, the cost of production was so expensive that a process innovation was 
required for the product to become available. I will later explain more about product 
innovations, but first I will concentrate on process innovations.  
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Process and product innovation can be linked to the theory on disruptive innovation. 
“Disruptive innovation is an innovation that helps create a new market and value 
network, and eventually goes on to disrupt an existing market and value network” 
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(Christensen, 2013). The term refers to an innovation that ends up transforming the 
market in a way no one would expect. Disruptive innovation differs from process 
innovation and product innovation in that it creates a new value network 
(Christensen, 2013).  A value network is a redefinition of the value chain. Where the 
value chain defines the way a firm creates value, the value network describes how a 
firm creates value through its processes and its peers (Allee, 2000). Christensen 
distinguish between disruptive innovation and sustaining innovation. The latter 
innovation is a group of process innovation and product innovation we defined 
above. Christensen defines sustaining innovation as technology that targets high-
demand customers who continuously demand improved performance over existing 
solutions. Such innovations become available through the normal pace of year-by-
year improvements, or as new break-through technology products (Christensen, 
2013). Sustaining innovations is the introduction of something new, whereas 
disruptive innovations make use of products that already exist. They appear in two 
types: New market disruptions and low-end disruptions. 
 
New market disruptions enable a new set of customers to use a product or an 
innovation (Christensen, 2013). A good example is when Canon released its first 
desktop photocopier, as it allowed people to make copies in their own office or at 
home. The result was the people started copying more than before. “New-market 
disruptors’ challenge is to create a value network where it is the non-consumption, 
not the incumbent, that must be overcome” (Christensen, 2013). The non-
consumption market is disruptive to the entire market. It is therefore harder for an 
incumbent to compete with an entrant targeting this market because its market 
position acts as a barrier to entry the market. 
 
Low-end disruptions concentrate on the bottom level of the mainstream market. 
They are most often low-cost business models that seek to reduce the marginal cost 
of production. Low cost airlines like Ryan Air and EasyJet are examples of low-end 
disruptions. They challenged the existing airline companies by establishing one or 
more bases to maximize the number of destinations rather than operate hubs as the 
mainline carriers. They stripped down the added services, purchased a new fuel-
efficient fleet, and charged extra for meals and priority boarding to lower their 
marginal cost below their competitors. Initially, incumbent do not recognize the 
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disruption as a threat, and will therefore not respond to their entrance in the market. 
Responding to competitors’ innovation behavior leads us over to the dynamics 
between competitors in a market, which we will discuss in the next part.  
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Figure 3 Market structure and innovation 
 
Market structure is defined by the number of suppliers, the type of competition in a 
market, the barriers to entry, and substitutability between products. The ongoing 
debate in the literature is what market structure is the most optimal to foster 
innovation. Market structure and innovation is a two-way relationship in that they 
affect each other. Market structures create incentives to innovate, but the market 
structure can also be an outcome of innovation. If the innovator has a patent in the 
innovation, the innovator is granted monopoly for the new product if it is a drastic 
process innovation or if it is a product innovation. We will concentrate on how 
market structure affects the incentives to innovate. However, some of the models I 
will present assume a defined market structure is the natural outcome of the cyclical 
innovation process. We will therefore touch into the subject. The debate stretches 
between two extremes of market structure: perfectly competitive markets and 
monopoly markets. The latter has seen to gain much support from theory, but 
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empirical evidence suggest otherwise (Sastry, 2005). I will start by presenting the 
theory favoring monopoly and then continue with the model favoring perfect 
competitive market. Note that the underlying assumptions in the two models are not 
equal, and therefore cannot be compared as perfect substitutes.  
   
;.6.- )3%"+:>%&5%,+340+:'*&
Creative destruction was termed by Joseph Schumpeter in 1943 in the book 
“Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”. Schumpeter was the first thinker to write 
about entrepreneurship and the role of innovation in firms’ growth. Schumpeter 
makes a distinction between process innovation and product innovation. Where 
inventions are new products launched on the market, entrepreneurial innovation is 
not only the introduction of new products, but also new means of production or new 
forms of organisation (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 82). Innovation leads to destruction of 
existing markets, as new innovations replace old technologies, skills and ideas, 
making them obsolete (Liberty, 2013). Destruction is the necessary condition for 
further growth. New innovations will lead to the destruction of existing products or 
methods of production. Several industries have gone trough periods of creative 
destruction. Take the horseshoe industry for example. When the automobile industry 
gained a foothold, several employees in the horseshoe industry lost their jobs 
because people bought cars instead. Unemployment and relocation occurred as a 
result of the introduction of the new technology, but created even more employments 
in the long run (Nathan, 2013, para. 9). Creative destruction is a natural process that 
happens in cycles, replacing existing technology and processes with improved 
technology, creating new jobs and maintaining economic growth that benefits the 
society through increasing total surplus.  
 
Schumpeter did not put much emphasis on markets in perfect competition. Perfect 
competition assumes all firms in an industry produce homogenous goods at the same 
price, which equals marginal cost. Perfect competition remains in the eyes of 
Schumpeter only as an ideal situation that maximizes social welfare, but which can 
never be achieved. “Perfect competition is and has always has been temporarily 
suspended whenever anything new is being introduced – automatically or by 
measures devised for the purpose – even in otherwise perfectly competitive 
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conditions” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 105). It makes no sense to study innovation under 
perfect competition, as introduction of a new innovation violates the assumption 
behind perfect competition in that all firms are homogenous. Studying oligopolies 
and monopolies gives more appropriate results. Schumpeter argued that monopolies 
are better suited to undertake innovations because the market structure creates 
larger incentives for monopolists than for perfect competitive firms. The incentive to 
invest in a process innovation can be represented as: !! !! − !! !! !≡ ∆! 
where !! is the marginal cost with the old technology and !! is the marginal cost with 
the new technology (Helmers, 2009).  
 
Schumpeter’s theory has gained support from numerous economists (Blundell, 
Griffith, & Reenen, 1999; Denicol, 2001; Etro, 2004; Gilbert, 2006), and several 
factors argue in favor of monopoly being a catalyst for innovation. First of all, 
monopolists have large capacity. They have the economies of scale that enables them 
to gain larger profits from any innovation. Blundell et al. (as cited in Sastry, 2005) 
have studied the relationship between the firms’ market share and investments in 
R&D. The result was positive. Not only do larger firms innovate more, they also 
benefited more from their investments in R&D (Blundell et al., 1999). They can 
spread the cost over a larger quantity produced (Helmers, 2009). Second, being the 
sole producer allows the firm to charge prices well above marginal cost, creating 
larger incentives than under perfect competition. Third, monopolists are not 
threatened by imitation by their competitors (Sastry, 2005). Under perfect 
competition, firms can easily imitate their competitors, resulting in more intense 
competition. Monopolists are naturally protected from imitation, thus creating larger 
profits as they can charge higher prices. Fourth, monopolists are better positioned to 
succeed with R&D because they have more in-depth understanding of their products 
and the demand of the customers, allowing them to undertake more precise 
investment decisions (Sastry, 2005). There are other factors that influence 
monopolists’ incentive to undertake innovation, but we will describe these factors 
more in detail after we have introduced the model favoring perfect competition. 
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Arrow represents the other side of the discussion. In 1962, Kenneth D. Arrow 
demonstrated that the “incentives to invent is less under monopolistic than under 
competitive conditions” (Arrow, 1976, p. 157). Arrow shows that the incentive to 
innovate is larger when competition exists pre-innovation than under monopoly 
because there is no “replacement effect” for competitive firms. The monopolist’s 
innovation is in a way self-cannibalizing as it replaces some of the monopolist’s 
existing market with the new technology, hence the replacement effect. The 
competitor has only an upside through investing in the innovation. He has no profits 
to lose, as its pre-innovation price is set to marginal cost. Assuming competitive 
firms can capture the same profits as a monopolist with the same innovation, their 
returns are relatively higher.  
 
Arrow’s (1976) model is based on several assumptions. First, the model only covers 
process innovations, meaning that the new marginal cost from the process 
innovation is lower than the original marginal cost. For a non-drastic innovation, the 
innovator gains a competitive advantage over its competitors. His market share 
remains the same, but he will gain from the profit generated through a decreased 
marginal cost. For a drastic innovation, the innovator is granted monopoly power, 
thus the incentive is represented by the monopoly profit with the new innovation. 
Second, firms produce a homogenous good and have the same marginal cost pre-
innovation. The only incentive to innovate is the potential profit achieved by the new 
invention and there is only one successful innovator. The model assumes the 
innovator enjoys exclusive property rights to the invention. The competitive firm is 
assumed to earn no profit using the old technology, hence destructing the old source 
of income. The same applies to the monopolist, but since the monopolist already 
gains a profit, the replacement effect makes his incentive relatively lower than for the 
firm in perfect competition.  
 
These are the two points of view of the relationship between market structure and 
innovation. Note that I have only mentioned process innovation so far. Product 
innovation will be described later. In the next section, we will look at how incentives 
to innovate change in a monopoly threatened by entry. 
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How does the incentive to innovate change in a monopoly that is threatened by 
entry? Gilbert and Newberry (1982) explore this question in the article Preemptive 
Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly. In their model, there is one monopolist 
with an old technology in competition with a potential entrant about a new 
innovation. The new technology is invented at an independent research lab, and the 
two firms engage in a bidding process for the patent. The firm that obtains the patent 
for the innovation is granted monopoly for the new product. Each firm’s incentive to 
innovate depends on the additional profit generated by the innovation. The incentive 
is determined by the difference in profits with and without the patent. For the 
entrants, the pre-innovation profit is zero. If he enters, the monopolist and the 
entrant will compete with each other, the entrant with the new technology and the 
monopolist with the old technology. The maximum amount the entrant is willing to 
bid is the duopoly profit with two firms: !!(!!, !!) 
The maximum amount the monopolist is willing to bid is the difference between the 
monopoly profit and the duopoly profit: !! !! − !!(!!, !!) 
When we compare the two equations together, we get: !! !! − !! !!, !! ≥ !! !!, !!  
  
From the equation, we can see that the monopolist has a stronger (but weak) 
incentive to innovate than the entrant when he is threatened by entry. Gilbert and 
Newberry call this the “efficiency effect” (Gilbert & Newberry, 1982). The monopolist 
has an incentive to maintain monopoly and will therefore place a larger bid to 
preempt entry. 
 
The model is based on a set of assumptions (Helmers, 2009). First, it assumes the 
successful innovator is granted exclusive property rights. Second, the model assumes 
the firm with the highest bid gets the innovation. The firms are treated equally, 
saying that they have equal opportunity to acquire the innovation (Gilbert & 
Newberry, 1982). However, this argument requires innovation to take place outside 
of the firm because both firms have the opportunity to bid for the innovation. This 
may not be the case in several situations. R&D can take place within the firm. This 
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assumption would require all innovation to take place in individual research groups 
that sells patents on new technology. Furthermore, the entrants can exclusively enter 
the market through acquisition of the patent (Helmers, 2009). The model assumes 
the monopolist will gain no profits on its old technology (Helmers, 2009). The 
innovation is therefore totally destructive of the old market. The last factor assumes 
there are no constraints in financing the investment (Helmers, 2009). The 
assumption is rather unrealistic, as monopolists generally have significantly larger 
access to capital markets than entrants.  
 
I will summarize what we know so far. We have talked about three different market 
structures: Innovation in monopoly, innovation in perfect competition, and 
innovation in markets where an incumbent is threatened by entry. For process 
innovations under: 
- Monopoly: a monopolist’s incentive to innovate is defined by the difference 
between the monopoly profits with the new marginal cost and the profits with 
old marginal cost. The model assumes the old technology is obsolete once the 
new technology is introduced 
- Perfect competition:  
o Drastic: The incentive is defined by the monopoly profits 
o Non-drastic: The incentive to invest is defined by the difference between 
profits in perfect competition and profits with the decreased marginal cost 
- Monopoly threatened by entry: The incentive for the monopolist is defined 
by the difference between the monopoly profit with the old technology and 
monopolist’s profit if the rival enters the market 
 
These models are simplified versions of the reality. When we include more variables 
in the study, the outcome may change. Etro (2004) has used the same approach  as 
Gilbert and Newberry (1982), but uses a Stackelberg model. The incumbent has first-
mover advantage for any new technology because he is the leader of the market and 
has by definition discovered the latest technology. Assuming no barriers to entry, 
Etro (2004) gets the same results as Gilbert and Newberry (1982). However, when 
entry barriers are present the case is different. With entry barriers, the incumbent is 
not threatened by competition from entrants, and the incentives to innovate is 
reduced (Etro, 2004, p. 283). This makes sense. Entry barriers create a natural 
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protection for competition, thus reducing the incentives to invest in R&D. So far, we 
cannot conclude on an optimal market structure for innovation. Including other 
variables may change to optimal outcome. We will look more into how a firm can 
build up its innovation capabilities, and how that may affect the incentives to 
innovate. 
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Henderson (1993) makes a distinction between market structure and the capabilities 
to invent. Besides the competitive advantage gained through economies of scale, 
monopoly power places incumbents in a position to acquire more information than 
entrants. Capabilities to invest in R&D increase with the accumulation of 
information firms acquire by operating in a market. Firms operating in an industry 
have more information about the market, its consumers and the existing technology 
than potential entrants. For entrants, access to such information is expensive and 
difficult to acquire. The information acquired by the established corporations is used 
to guide the future development of new products and new innovations. The 
information is considered an asset to the firm. The knowledge is closely related to the 
firm’s existing products. New innovations from the firm are therefore incremental, 
small changes that improve the existing product. “Incremental innovation is, in this 
context, defined as routine, predictable change that is a logical extension of existing 
knowledge” (Henderson, 1993, p. 251). The organisation builds structures and 
routines to become efficient in gathering more knowledge about their product and 
the market. Henderson’s argument supports Schumpeter’s theory that monopolies 
are better equipped to undertake innovation decisions. But the same assets that 
create incentives to undertake incremental innovations creates proportional 
disadvantage in developing radical product innovations. Janis Curtis expressed this 
in an article on Forbes.com: “I don’t think that the person who first invented bottle 
water, went to the consumer and asked whether they would like their tap water in 
plastic bottles so that they could pay a dollar or more for the privilege” (Curtis, 2013, 
para. 6). The theory assumes the consumer knows its own preferences. Several 
products may never have been invented if firms were required to know the 
consumers’ opinion before doing an innovation decision. Take the iPad for example. 
Arguing that consumers had a need for the iPad before it came to the market is a 
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poor argument to explain its success. Whether the product generates a need or 
whether a product is an outcome of a need is a never-ending discussion. To get back 
to our discussion, information about the market and the consumers may not always 
be an asset that fosters innovation. They reduce the incumbents’ efficiency in 
exploiting radical innovations (Henderson, 1993). Because the monopolists’ 
structure is built up based on their current position, responding to aggressive 
entrants may be difficult. Their large size makes if tougher to handle competition 
faced by entrants on new markets. An innovation is radical if it requires the firms to 
process quite different information” (Henderson, 1993, p. 251). Following 
Henderson’s argument, monopolists are better equipped to undertake incremental 
innovations because they have attained deep knowledge in the market about their 
product. However, the same asset creates a barrier to exploit radical innovations, 
placing monopolists in a position of being leapfrogged by new entrants. Gilbert and 
Newberry also discuss monopolists’ threat of being leapfrogged by entrants, but they 
assume monopolists are aware of the threat and will invest more to preempt entry. 
The capability variable is however not part of their model. Henderson argues that the 
reason former literature has failed to give a definite answer is because research has 
failed to “integrate theories of heterogeneous research capabilities into neoclassic 
theories of investment behavior” (Henderson, 1993, p. 249). It clearly gives a 
reasonable explanation to why empirical studies fail to support theories favoring 
monopolies as the optimal market structure for innovation.  
 
I will include a last factor that is especially relevant to the music industry and that 
has large effects on the incentives to innovate, intellectual property. 
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Analysis of product innovations is more difficult because products are differentiated. 
Differentiation opens the model for other variables that may affect the incentive to 
innovate. First of all, a product innovation includes an identical replacement effect 
for both the monopolist as well as the competitive firm, however the effect is larger 
for the monopolist as it steals profits from the existing product (Gilbert, 2006). 
Second, product innovations allow firms to differentiate vertically and price-
discriminate between consumers. Greenstein and Ramey (1998) (as cited in Gilbert, 
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2006, p. 167) show that monopolists have potentially more to gain from product 
innovations than competitors because it allows them to create different markets for 
their customers, separating them and charging prices according to their willingness 
to pay. In an article by Pia Weiss (2003), the author examines the effects of the 
degree of competition on firm’s incentives to innovate in differentiated products. 
Weiss presents the innovation choice through the fashion industry, which every 
season is faced with the question whether to design a new collection, reorganize the 
collection or do nothing. The author demonstrates that firms favor process 
innovation if the degree of differentiation is high. Similar to the contrary situation, 
when product differentiation is low, firms prefer product innovation. Competition 
intensity decreases with the level of differentiation. Firms are less likely to release a 
product innovation when they have close to monopoly power in the market. Firms in 
perfect competition have relatively more to gain from product innovation because it 
grants them larger profits the more the product is differentiated from existing 
products. Ebiina and Shimizu (2008) have also studied innovation in differentiated 
markets, but they have assumed a duopoly in a spatial Cournot model where the level 
of investment in R&D is endogenous. They have assumed firms are allowed to invest 
in subsequent process innovations following the release of a product innovation. 
Their model includes transport costs. Their results show that when transport cost is 
present, firms are less willing to invest in product innovations. The results are 
similar to Weiss. When firms locate as far apart from each other as possible, the 
incentive to invest in product innovation decreases because the products are already 
differentiated and the competition is less intense. 
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Empirical research does not support that large firms are better positioned to 
undertake innovation because of economies of scale, risk diversification and 
knowledge of the market. Schumpeter receives theoretical support, but little 
empirical support. However, this does not mean that competition creates larger 
incentives to innovate than large firms. It is difficult to measure the effect of 
innovation when the way innovation is measured differs in every situation. “Firm 
heterogeneity makes it difficult to identify a stable relationship between innovation 
and a firm’s competitive position” (Hashmi & Biesebroeck, 2012). The methods that 
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have been used can be classified as measuring input or output (Symeonidis, 1996). 
Output measures include the number of patents or investments in R&D.  Input 
measures are not solid because they are subject to error of accounting and financial 
reporting practices (Symeonidis, 1996). Neither is the number of patents, as they 
may vary in economic value. Measuring investments in research and development is 
another method, but this favors the large firms that have an R&D department. Small 
firms may not have a distinct R&D department, and these firms may be neglected 
(Symeonidis, 1996). We could count the number of significant innovations per firm, 
but innovations vary in size, which makes it difficult to find an equal measure among 
firms. Literature on microeconomics and industrial organization often measure 
creative destruction by looking at entry and exit patterns in an industry, and firm 
turnover is used in the macroeconomic literature (Mazzucato & Tancioni, 2005). 
Mazzucato and Tancioni (2005) argue that if the goal is to measure creative 
destruction, it is as important to look at relative changes in firms position in the 
market, as it measures the battle between firms. This could be an interesting 
approach to the music industry, but it would require that we have sales data on the 
industry. I will describe how I will measure innovation in the next chapter after I 
have summarized the theory that has been discussed so far. 
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The incentive to invest in innovation is defined by the additional profits a firm can 
earn by investing in a new innovation. We have defined three types of innovation, 
process, product and disruptive innovation. A process innovation allows a firm to 
benefit from a decrease in marginal cost. A product innovation is the introduction of 
a radical product to the market. A disruptive innovation is either a new radical 
product or an innovative business models that take advantage of existing products 
and sell them in new markets or target the low-cost segment of the industry. 
Incentives to invest in process innovations are higher for competitors than for 
monopolists in the setting where the monopolist is protected from entry and 
competition by other firms. When firms can bid on the innovation, the outcome is 
reversed. Most emphasize has been placed on process innovation because it is the 
most present in the literature. It is easier to measure because product innovation 
includes a different set of variables. Competitors and incumbents can both benefit 
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from introducing product innovations, but if the product makes the existing products 
obsolete, the results correlates with process innovation (Gilbert, 2006).  
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4 The Model 
I will explore the relationship between market structure and innovation in the record 
industry. The theory I have presented above gives an ambiguous relationship 
between market structure and innovation. Monopolies seem to foster process 
innovation in the case where the monopolist is threatened by entry, however if entry 
barriers are present, competition seems to create larger incentives to innovate. 
Unfortunately, there is no monotone relationship between market structure and 
innovation, because factors such as barriers to entry or differentiation affect the 
outcome. Product innovations make the case more difficult, because both the 
competitor and the monopolist are affected by the replacement effect, given that the 
new technology makes the old technology obsolete. To explore this relationship, I 
will measure the two types of innovation in the music industry. Innovation is the 
dependent variable whereas factors on market structure are the independent 
variables. The independent variable is divided in two categories, product innovation 
and process innovation.  
 
 
Figure 4 Innovation model in the record industry 
 
I have divided the value chain in product innovation and process innovation (see 
Figure 4). I consider the release of a new artist to the market as a product innovation. 
The artist possesses certain characteristics that differentiate her from the existing 
artists in the market. Once the artist is released, the label can choose to release 
subsequent albums, which I define as process innovations. The label can 
theoretically release an unlimited number of process innovations after the artist is 
released in the market. The process innovation is therefore represented in the model 
as a cyclical process. I assume that the old product still remains in the market when a 
process innovation is released.  
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Product innovation has been defined as the introduction of a product that offers a set 
of characteristics that differentiates it from the existing products in the market. I 
consider the release of an artist that has never been released in the market before as 
a product innovation. The artist offers something new that differentiates her from 
the established artists in the market. It is a product with a set of characteristics that 
consumers may like or not. A product innovation involves more risk than a process 
innovation, as the firm usually knows how consumers will respond to a process 
innovation. However, a product innovation allows the label to benefit from 
subsequent process innovations. The potential profits may therefore be larger. The 
incentive to innovate is determined by the difference between the profits before the 
innovation is launched and the profits after.  
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A process innovation is, as I explained in the theoretical chapter, an innovation that 
decreases the marginal cost of production, so that !! < !!. The following model from 
Belleflamme & Peitz (2010) demonstrates how we can determine the size of the 
innovation and the incentive to innovate for a drastic innovation. If we have an 
inverse demand function, ! ! = !! − !, the Cournot profit is the following:  
 
!!"#!! = ! − !!! + !!!!!! + 1 ! 
 
If we assume the marginal cost is equal for all firms in the initial stage, !! = !! = !, 
the profit function becomes  !!"# = ! − !! + 1 ! 
The profit depends on the size of the market, a, and the marginal cost, !. If the 
marginal cost decreases from !! to !!, the new profit function becomes  !!"#$ = ! − !!! + ! − 1 !!! + 1 ! 
The incentive to innovate is the difference between the profits with and without the 
innovation, ! = !!!"#$ − !!"#. We assumed that the innovation is non-drastic. In that 
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case, the monopoly price corresponding to !! is larger than the initial cost, !!, so that !!!!! > !!, which is the same as !! − !! < ! − !!. ! − !! measures the size of the initial 
market, and !! − !! measures the absolute size of the innovation. We thus have the 
relative size of the innovation so that: ! ≡ !! − !!! − !!  
 
I consider an artist’s second, third, fourth or any other consecutive release as a 
process innovation. There are two reasons that support this assumption.  
 
First, digital distribution has reduced the marginal cost of music reproduction to 
zero. Following the model above, there is actually no marginal cost to decrease if we 
want to release a new album for an artist. However, when an artist with an existing 
catalogue (an artist with one or more previous releases) releases a new album, the 
artist does not only generate sales from the new album, but it increases streams and 
sales of the entire catalogue. A new album reminds the consumers about an artist 
and its old content, and increases the streams for the entire catalogue. 
 
Second, the firm’s profit in the pre-situation depends on the difference between 
market size and the marginal cost, ! − ! . Since !! < !!, the difference between the 
market size and the marginal cost increases with a process innovation. Process 
innovation can therefore be defined as a change in the difference between market 
size and marginal cost. If we assume a new album released to the market is 
increasing the size of the market, rather than decreasing marginal cost, it changes the 
difference between the market size and the marginal cost. Since process innovation is 
defined as an increase in the relationship between market size and marginal cost, we 
can define the release of a new album as process innovation. 
 
In order to measure the degree of investment in product innovation and process 
innovation by major labels and independent labels, I will use logistic regression to 
see if the type of innovation can be explained by certain factors on market structure.  
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I have very few secondary data on the market structure. I will therefore use a 
combination of secondary and primary data to describe the market structure. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable for the type of innovation: 1 is product 
innovation and 0 is process innovation. The independent variables in the regression 
are a binary variable for the type of label, a sales success variable and album reviews. 
I will describe the market structure based on the interviews with two major labels.  
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Market structure will be described through demand for music, the type of 
competition in the market, market concentration, research capabilities and barriers 
to entry.  
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Major Labels 
I will concentrate on the type of firms in the music industry, respectively major labels 
and independent labels. Major labels have a large catalogue and easy access to capital 
in order to finance new musical acts. They used to control almost 80 percent of the 
industry’s total revenue, and still accounts for the majority of the revenues. A major 
label is different from an independent label in that is a multinational firm. On a 
national level, they work with releasing national artists as well as promoting 
international acts signed on their label. Because of the large market power of major 
labels, they fit well with the description of a monopolist, or a firm with a degree of 
monopoly power.  
 
Independent Labels 
There are hundreds of independent labels, and they vary significantly in size. They 
may be one-man labels or large labels that release the same amount as major labels, 
but with a limited international appearance. Independent labels do not have a large 
catalogue to benefit from, and can therefore not rely on old content to survive. They 
have to produce new music to survive in the industry, and therefore they are more 
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reactive to new trends and continuously search for new opportunities. Because of the 
small size, they are not bound by the organizational boundaries of the major labels.  
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Sales success is determined by whether an album has been listed on the hit list, VG-
lista, or not. Since the list is generated based on music sales, it measures the relative 
sales of an album. Process innovations are more likely to be listed on the hit list, 
given that the previous album was a success. If the first album was a failure, the label 
is less likely to invest in a second album with the same artist. Although an album may 
be unsuccessful in terms of sales, the artist may be successful according to other 
variables, for example live concerts. However, the study is limited to the recording 
industry. Since their mission is to produce music, variables outside the recording 
industry will be excluded. I therefore created a performance ratio for every album 
that takes into account the number of weeks the album was listed as well as the 
ranking number.  
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Album reviews can determine the quality of an album. The same line of reasoning 
applies to reviews as for hit lists - process innovations are more likely to get reviewed 
than product innovations because the artist is already known in the market. Far from 
all albums are reviewed. The selection is not random. I assume journalists pick 
albums from artists they are already familiar with or from labels with a good track 
record of releasing innovations.  
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I will measure how the type of innovation depends on the market structure through a 
logistic regression model. Logistic models measures the relationship between a 
dependent variable and independent variables where the dependent variable is a 
binary variable. Product innovation will be denoted as 1 and process innovation will 
be denoted as 0. The regression takes the form !!! = !! + !!!! + !!!! + !!!! 
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where the coefficients we want to measure are given as the probability of the 
variables’ effect on the dependent variable, ! ! ! . I have used logistic instead of 
ordinary least squares because the dependent variable is binomial.  
 
I have denoted every product innovation as 1 and every process innovation as 0. 
Every major label has also been denoted as 1 and every independent label as 0. 
Regression variables can be found in appendix 10.2. !
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5 Methodology 
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Research design is a map of procedures describing how you will answer the research 
question. It contains the objectives of the research, the sources of data and the 
constraints of the research (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). Choosing an 
optimal research design depends on the research question. There are generally three 
types of research design: Exploratory, descriptive and explanatory (Saunders et al., 
2009). An exploratory study questions phenomena to seek what is happening in the 
situation studied. It starts with a broad focus that is narrowed down as the research 
progresses. Descriptive studies give a broad picture of a specific situation, but are 
rarely used without additional studies (Saunders et al., 2009). Explanatory studies 
seek to establish relationship between variables in order to study the relationship 
between the variables. Our research is an explanatory study in which we aim to 
explain how market structure has an effect on the incentives to innovate in the music 
industry. 
 
There are two approaches on how to go about solving the research question: 
Deductive method and inductive method (Saunders et al., 2009). Deductive method 
is the logical approach where you define a hypothesis you will test and then explain 
the results with theoretical models. Inductive approach is the bottom-up approach 
where you first collect and analyze the data and then develop a theory based on the 
results of the research. This thesis will use a deductive approach to answer the 
research question. We have collected literature on a topic that we will test against the 
gathered data.  
 
How the data is collected depends on the research strategy. The research strategy is a 
search strategy; the strategy for how you will go about gathering and analyzing the 
information for your study. Some strategies fit within the inductive approach while 
others fit better within the deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2009). The most 
used strategies are experiment, survey, case study, action research, grounded theory, 
ethnography, and archival research (Saunders et al., 2009). Our research is a case 
study of the Norwegian record industry where I will explain the pattern observed in 
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the industry through a set of theories. Case study is often used for explanatory 
strategies as they allow to answer the questions “why”, “what” and “how” (Saunders 
et al., 2009). I will triangulate multiple sources of data to ensure that the data 
actually describes what I want to study (Saunders et al., 2009). I will collect 
quantitative data on music reviews and hit lists while we will collect qualitative data 
through interviews with a sample of the record labels. Quantitative method is a 
systematical research of numerical data that seek to establish a relationship between 
the data through statistical techniques (Saunders et al., 2009). As I am interested in 
finding an innovation pattern within the industry, a quantitative approach allows me 
to look for relationship between variables for a large sample. Qualitative method is a 
way to gather in-depth understanding of a specific situation through the use of non-
standardized data (Saunders et al., 2009), such as interviews, observations and 
documents. A qualitative method gives you a more detailed description of a situation 
and is useful for complex topics. I will use a multiple method, combining quantitative 
and qualitative research. Tashakorri and Teddlie (2003) (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 
153) argue that “multiple methods are useful if they provide better opportunities for 
you to answer your research questions and where they allow you to better evaluate 
the extent to which your research findings can be trusted and inferences made from 
them.” Multiple data allows me to ensure I study something meaningful. I performed 
preliminary interviews with several people in the music industry before I decided 
upon a research question. When the research question was set and I knew I was able 
to get all the quantitative data needed, I performed new interviews with record labels 
to go more in depth on the topic I had chosen. A mixed method of quantitative and 
qualitative analysis gives the researcher a wealth of data that allows him to discover 
findings he may not have anticipated (Saunders et al., 2009). Because few 
researchers have looked into the topic of this thesis, the qualitative interviews allow 
me to ensure that the quantitative data measure something meaningful.  
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Data are structured in categories depending on where they come from. Primary data 
is data collected primarily for this thesis. Secondary data is information that have 
been collected for another purpose, which may include everything from raw data to 
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published articles or reports (Saunders et al., 2009). I will use a mix of primary and 
secondary data. Because secondary data is collected for another purpose than this 
assignment, it is important to be critical about the reliability of the data, as I do not 
know how the data has been collected or the quality of the data.  
 
The primary data are the interviews with the record labels. The secondary data are 
the music reviews and the hit lists which are raw-data, as well as newspaper articles, 
research articles and reports which are processed data. I tried to get access to sales 
data for every record release, but this was not possible, nor were numbers on 
quantity sold.  
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I chose to perform interviews with some of the labels in the Norwegian record 
industry. Interviews can give an insight to the industry that I would not be able to get 
through secondary data such as news articles and reports. Since I wanted to find out 
the underlying reasons for why and how labels make investment decisions in new 
music, interviews allow me to identify whether there are more variables than the 
ones used in the empirical study that explains the investment behavior of the labels. 
The interviews were semi-structured, meaning that the researcher has a list of 
themes and questions he wants to discuss, but the questions and the order of the 
questions may vary from interview to interview (Saunders et al., 2009). Semi-
structured interviews allow the researcher to ask additional questions to explore the 
answers of the interviewee. Semi-structured interviews are very helpful in 
explanatory studies, as they help to understand the relationship between variables 
(Saunders et al., 2009).  
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There are two types of sampling techniques: Probability samples and non-probability 
samples (Saunders et al., 2009). Probability samples imply equal probability for each 
case being selected and that it is known. Non-probability samples mean the 
probability of each case being selected is not known, which means it is not possible to 
generalize the results to the entire population on a statistical ground (Saunders et al., 
2009). Probability samples are most used in quantitative research where you want to 
generalize results about a sample to the entire population. Non-probability, or non-
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random sampling, is often used in qualitative studies where probability samples are 
not possible, such as case studies (Saunders et al., 2009). I have chosen to use non-
random samples for the interviews because in order to understand the relationship 
between the variables in the study, I had to interview specific stakeholders that had 
knowledge about the variables. A random selection of people in the industry would 
not make sense. There are three techniques to select the appropriate sample: Quota 
sampling, purposive sampling and convenience sampling (Saunders et al., 2009). I 
will use purposive or judgmental sample, as it allows me to select the case I believe 
are most suited to answer my questions. Judgmental samples are often very useful 
“when you want to select cases that are particularly informative” (Saunders et al., 
2009, p. 239). It was important for me to get interviews with the employees within 
the record labels that were central in the investment decisions. These employees are 
often A&R1 managers, or in the independent labels, they are often the CEO of the 
label.  
 
The interviews were thorough and gave me an in-depth understanding of the 
Norwegian record industry. The respondents have been in the industry for several 
years in several different positions. It would have been better to get at least one 
interview with an independent label, but it was impossible within the time limits of 
this thesis.  
 
The following table contains the respondents.  
Record label Name Position Type of label 
Universal Music Yngve Næss A&R Manager Major 
EMI Music Jarle Savio A&R Manager Major 
Table 2 Interview respondents 
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Solid preparation is necessary in order to perform a successful interview (Saunders 
et al., 2009). I made an interview guide (appendix 10.6) that was used through the 
three interviews. I split the questions in four categories, the first concerning the 
                                                   
1 Artist and repertoir (A&R) executive is the title of someone in a label that takes care of the artists in a 
label. It is the person that takes the decisions about which artists to invest in. 
 48 
market for new music, the second concerning the label, the third concerning the new 
streaming platforms, and the fourth concerning innovation in the industry. I started 
by asking general questions about the market. Then I followed up with how they 
made decisions about music investments. I tried to identify how they perceived the 
dynamics between major labels and independent labels and then I asked them how 
they would define innovation in the music industry.  My definition of innovation in 
the music industry is somewhat untraditional, so I wanted to understand how they 
defined innovation in the music industry. 
 
Before I started the interview, I introduced myself and the research topic. I explained 
the background for my choice of topic to give them an idea of what I knew about the 
industry. I then explained the structure of the interview. Since I wanted to know how 
they defined innovation in the industry, I did not want to tell them too much about 
what definition I would outline in the thesis to avoid influencing their responses. The 
interviews were performed at the respective respondents’ offices in Oslo. The 
interviews were recorded and later transcribed. They were performed in Norwegian, 
but later translated to English by the author. The transcriptions were sent back to the 
respondents so that they could agree on the English translation of their answers. The 
respondents seemed to be unaffected by the audio recording of the interview. In 
general, participants may be stressed by the fact that their voice is recorded, but this 
did not seem as a problem in this case (Saunders et al., 2009). I took notes during 
the interview, both as a backup if I encountered technical problems with the audio 
recording and to be able to ask additional questions based on what the respondents 
answer. Taking notes also allows you to record information about the respondent’s 
physical reactions (Saunders et al., 2009). The last interview was made through 
Skype because we were not able to schedule a meeting the week I was in Oslo doing 
the other interviews. Phone interviews make it more difficult to record information 
about the physical reactions as well as building trust with the respondent (Saunders 
et al., 2009). However, I am satisfied with the interviews and got significantly more 
information than I anticipated. 
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The secondary data for the thesis is used in the quantitative part. Measuring 
innovation is often done by measuring each firm’s R&D expenditure or yearly 
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differences in market share (Mazzucato & Tancioni, 2005), but such data are not 
publicly available for the music industry. I have therefore obtained a list of all 
releases since year 2000 as well as a measure of the album’s popularity. I will explain 
more on this in the next section. 
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The data gathered are documentary secondary data (Saunders et al., 2009). I have 
obtained a list of Norwegian releases from Gramo1 from 2000 to 2012. The list 
contains information about an album’s title, artist, catalogue number, publishing 
date and the record label. I was first not able to get the list from Gramo, so I collected 
a list of albums based on the database from Rockipedia.no. Rockipedia is a site 
driven by a rock museum in Trondheim Norway called Rockheim (it means “home of 
the rock”) that collects information about Norwegian music history. The database 
also relies on contribution by users, but the library is regularly updated with new 
releases from the museum. I was able to extract their data using an API2. Once they 
sent me a list of all the registered labels, I created a query that searched through 
every release from the label on the list. The list contains 25 313 releases from 1928 
and until today. I noticed that as many as 3985 albums were categorized under the 
label “Unknown” and it lacked several albums compared to the list I received from 
Gramo. I could therefore only use the list to create a numerator for every album, 
which tells what number in line the album is. With the numerator, I know whether 
an album is an artist’s first or second album, and thereby whether it is a product or a 
process innovation. 
 
                                                   
1  Gramo is the joint collection society for Norwegian artists, musicians and producers. The 
organization collects remuneration from hotels, cafés, radio stations; users of music in public areas 
(Gramo, 2013). 
2  API: Application Programming Interface is a protocol that allows software components to 
communicate with each other. API’s are offered by several sites that stores information others may 
want access to, i.e. Facebook, Google, Youtube, Last.fm and Soundcloud.  APIs have predefined 
routines that tells you what kind of data you are allowed to extract. 
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The reviews are professional critiques of music albums. These are gathered through 
Popyoular, a web-crawling firm that gathers information about music reviews from 
national and international newspapers and magazines (Popyoular, 2013). Popyoular 
did not have information about what country the reviewed releases come from, so I 
had to send them a list with the album reviews I wanted. I received the list from 
Gramo relatively late, so I had to use the list from Rockipedia. I then matched the list 
I received with the album list from Gramo, which gave me 2035 reviews from 2005 
to 2012. Journalists use different scales when they rate albums. The reviews come 
from several sources. Popyoular has therefore converted them to a scale from 1 to 10, 
and the score I have obtained is the average score for every release. The reviews are 
discrete numerical data (Saunders et al., 2009), or ranked data, where 1 is the lowest 
score and 10 is the best. When ranked data have equal distance between each value, 
they can be analyzed as if they were interval data (Saunders et al., 2009). The reviews 
give us two types of information. First, it gives us a professional music journalist’s 
subjective opinion about the album. Second, it acts as a sort of quality filter. 
Newspapers get requests every day about reviewing albums that are released. Only a 
few of these albums are reviewed and published in the newspaper. We do not know 
how journalists pick the albums they review, but we assume that it is more likely that 
artists journalists have heard of are more likely to get reviewed than unknown artists. 
This is also where the role of the label comes in. A part of an album promotion is to 
get reviewed. Labels send releases to journalists to get them reviewed. We assume 
that labels that are known for releasing quality content are more likely to get their 
albums released. 
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Billboard releases weekly charts with data of the most popular artists in the 
American market. The corresponding list on the Norwegian market is VG Lista, 
published by the the Norwegian newspaper, “Verdens Gang” (VG). The list is 
generated by weekly sales number from IFPI. The numbers are based on physical 
and digital sales. The four lists published are: Top 10 Norwegian songs, Top 30 
Norwegian albums, Top 20 singles and Top 40 albums. We will concentrate on the 
Top 30 Norwegian albums as the Top 40 list contains foreign albums.  
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I assume that the longer an album stays on VG-lista, the more it sells and creates 
profits to the label. It is in the label’s interest to have their release listed on the list 
for as long as possible. The longer the album is on the list, the larger the incentive. 
However, it is different whether the album is listed number one or number 30 in the 
entire period. I will therefore create a score index that defines the value of being 
listed:  ! = ! 1!!!!  
where n is the week number and  !! is the weekly ranking.  
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The list of releases contains all registered releases in the Norwegian market, which 
means that releases that have not been registered in Gramo’s database is not 
included in the study. The list may contain some noise, and can therefore be filtered 
in order to obtain a list of quality music. The noise comes from the large number of 
one-man labels that have only released one or two album during the last 13 years. 
These labels have an important role in the music industry, but they can disturb the 
results. I will therefore perform analysis with an unfiltered list and a filtered list. To 
filter the list, I will only pick the albums that have either been listed on VG-lista or 
been reviewed by a newspaper. VG-lista is the relative measure of sales while the 
review is a measure of quality. It is reasonable to think that the two variables are not 
independent. If an album is listed on the hit list, it is more likely to have been 
reviewed, but not the other way around. Niche music can receive very good rating, 
but may not necessarily be listen on the hit list. 
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As the information is secondary data, I cannot know for sure the level of quality of 
the data. The reviews may be the data where reliability can be an issue, but the 
reviews do not represent an important part of the thesis. I assume that the list of 
albums from Gramo is reliable, as Gramo is the official register of Norwegian 
albums.  
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Gramo pointed out an interesting remark about the album data that may affect the 
validity of the results. Gramo’s lists only contain information about the last label that 
contributed to an album. This means that we cannot tell whether the album is 
licensed from an indie label to a major label or whether the major label owns the 
album. If the label is licensed from an independent label to a major label, we cannot 
know who has invested in the album. The distribution through a major label can 
either be a licensing deal, where the major label has paid an advancement to the 
artist for the album, or it may be a distribution deal where the major label only 
distributes the album through its physical and digital channels. This factor will create 
a positive bias towards major labels, as they will account for more albums than what 
they actually have produced. This effect is possibly larger for earlier releases when 
more independent labels distributed through majors’ distribution channels. Several 
independent labels rely on other distribution channels on the digital platform. This 
can give an impression of major labels taking more risk than they actually do.  
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The study concerns the Norwegian market for recorded music. The Norwegian 
market may have different characteristics than other record markets, and for the 
study to be generalized to other markets, the differences in market structure must be 
taken into account. The Norwegian labels meet frequently in the market and can 
easily observe each other’s strategies. Norway is a small economy that takes the 
international market as given. Norwegian artists will rarely be able to compete on an 
international level like American artists. There are several reasons behind this 
argument. First, several Norwegian artists sing in Norwegian. Only the Nordic 
countries understand the language, and the music may therefore have less appeal in 
non-Norwegian speaking countries. Second, becoming an international artist 
requires access to significant capital. According to IFPI, breaking an artist through a 
major label in the American market requires $1,4 million in investments (IFPI, 
2012). Third, Norway is together with Sweden one of the pioneer markets in 
adopting streaming services and digital advertising. Some markets still rely on the 
old model. In Germany for example, the primary distribution is physical and the 
labels still use television commercials to promote new albums. 
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6 Results and Analysis 
In this chapter, I will present the findings from the interviews and the empirical 
study of the product and process innovations in the music industry. I will start by 
presenting the results on the dependent variable, innovation. I will then present the 
results on the explanatory variables. 
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I wanted to know how the respondents would define innovation to see if there is 
reason to believe that releasing new music can be defined as innovation. I asked 
them how they would define innovation in the record industry. Both respondents 
relate innovation to separate elements in the value chain. Yngve Næss at Universal 
Music distinguishes between two types of innovation in the industry:  
 
“The technological part of the industry, how people can stream and download 
music today, is one of the most innovative changes in the industry today. The 
second one is what we do every day, to release new music”. Yngve Næss, A&R 
Executive, Universal Music. 
 
The first relates to innovation in distribution of music while the second relates to 
innovation in the creation element of the value chain. Næss elaborates the latter part 
further, saying that innovation is to: 
 
“Develop and succeed with new artists. But innovation can also be to find new 
artists and not succeed. Whether they succeed or not is not always important, but 
having the opportunity to spot new talent and bring their product to the market is 
how I would define innovation in the music industry”. Yngve Næss, A&R Executive, 
Universal. 
 
His definition strengthens my definition of innovation. Universal does not 
distinguish between new artists and existing artists, but he perceives the discovery 
and release of new music as innovation. While Næss refers to finding and succeeded 
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with new artists, Jarle Savio from EMI Music puts more emphasis on the promotion 
part of the value chain: 
 
“Since we work with music every day, we do not see a new song as an innovation. 
But for outsiders, it may be seen as innovation. Innovation for us is new ways of 
promoting artists”, Jarle Savio, EMI Music.  
 
Savio refers to a promotion project they did with one of their artists last year. They 
encouraged the fans to create a cover version of the artist’s new single and send it to 
EMI. The person with the best contribution got a record single contract with the 
label. The project was a huge success and attracted lots of attention. The artist even 
received an innovation award at the yearly Spellemannsprisen1. Savio seems to 
acknowledge that production and discovery of new music can be perceived as 
innovation, but that his personal definition of innovation is different. He continues 
to elaborate on the incentives to innovate, and argues that the incentive to release 
successful innovations in the industry comes from each employee’s personal interest 
on promoting quality music: 
 
“I would say it’s personal. My personal trigger is to find a new artist, develop her 
and release her to the public”. Jarle Savio, A&R Executive EMI Music.  
 
The respondents agreed that innovation in the music industry could be described as 
the creation, production, distribution and promotion of music, which correlate with 
the definition of innovation outlined in chapter 4. They do not distinguish between 
product and process innovation, but EMI confirms my assumption that new releases 
increase the sales of older releases: 
 
“What is interesting is that once an artist releases a new song or an album, the 
entire catalogue of that artist increases in streams”, Jarle Savio, A&R Executive 
EMI Music. 
 
                                                   
1  Spellemannsprisen is an award given to Norwegian artists and authors that have made an 
outstanding musical achievement in the last year (Spellemann, 2013). The award corresponds to the 
American Grammy Award. 
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The statement confirms the assumption behind my definition of process innovation. 
A new release increases the sales of old releases. There is no replacement effect 
present, but rather a catalyst effect. New music revitalizes old music. According to 
Assink’s (2006) definition on process innovation in Chapter 3, process innovations 
“carry lower financial and market-acceptance risk”. As streaming increases the effect 
of a process innovation, labels should have larger incentives to undertake process 
innovations than product innovations. Since this trend is present for all EMIs new 
releases, I assume that the effect is present also for other labels. The effect may 
however differ depending on the type of artist.  
 
I will continue to look at releasing new music as product innovations and releasing 
albums from existing innovations as process innovations. I will go further into what 
product and process innovation the labels invest in.  
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I was interested in knowing how the labels choose what artists and projects to invest 
in. I asked the respondents about how many artists they worked with, how many 
albums they released in a year and how many of the releases came from new artists.  
 
We release 10 to 15 Norwegian albums per year. A third of these are debutants. 
They may be new to EMI, but they may have released an EP at another label or on 
their own. Several of our new artists have already released an EP1 or an album, 
which is very wise. That way, we see that they know what it takes to produce and 
promote an album, and it shows that they are willing to work hard. Jarle Savio, 
EMI Music.  
 
At first sight, the number of releases seems relatively low for a major company, but 
when we take into account the fact that they also work with releases from 
international artists in the Norwegian market, the number increases. We notice two 
things from the statement above. One third of their releases come from new artist, 
which means that the number of process innovations is larger than the number of 
                                                   
1 Extended play (EP) is a recording that contains more songs than a single, but which is too short to be 
considered a studio album (LP). 
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product innovations. Second, several of the new artists have started their career at 
independent labels or released an album on their own. This is an interesting 
observation that can be interpreted in several ways. It means that what a major label 
perceives as a product innovation may actually be a process innovation in the 
market. If this is a trend, we will see a larger amount of product innovations in 
independent labels than in major labels. Furthermore, it could mean that major 
labels use independent labels as a way to recruit new artists to their firm. This 
reduces the major labels’ risk of investment in new artists, because the major label 
knows already whether the artist has an audience or not. Savio at EMI confirms this 
strategy: 
 
“We want to be the best. We prefer to work longer with every artist, sign fewer 
artists, but it means that we have to pick the artists that can succeed. We have to 
succeed with 70% of the artists”, Jarle Savio, EMI Music.  
 
Yngve Næss at Universal acknowledges that independent labels are important 
suppliers of product innovations:  
 
“Working with indie labels allows us to get access the music defined as “cred 
music1”, Yngve Næss, Universal Music.  
 
Universal is larger than EMI and intuitively work with a larger pool of artists. 
 
We develop as many artists as we are capable of working with. It depends on the 
number of employees, our obligations with existing artists and how the market is 
for new music. We sign two to four new artists per year at Universal and have 
approximately 35 local Norwegian artists under contract”, Yngve Næss, Universal 
Music. 
 
Universal and EMI acknowledge that investing in new artists are risky. When an 
artist signs with a label, they often agree on production of one album with options for 
subsequent albums later. These contracts are more flexible now than in the analogue 
                                                   
1 Cred is a slang word for credible. 
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era, with options for one or two albums, compared to three or four earlier. For new 
artists, option on a second album is necessary, as the profits from the first release 
rarely covers the album investment. 
 
 “You seldom make money on the first album. It takes time to build a career. “ EMI 
Music 
 
Product innovations do not seem to be profitable, or at least not for major labels. 
However, when the discounted future process innovations following a product 
innovation are taken into account, the number may become positive. This correlates 
well with the model from Ebina and Shimizu (2008) introduced in chapter 3. They 
modelled the incentives to innovate where firms could decide between process and 
product innovation. If products are differentiated, firms will prefer to invest in 
process innovations. The choice can be thought of as a choice between a long-term 
and a short-term investment. This assumption is however false, because a process 
innovation can also be long-term in that today’s investment in a process innovation 
increases the likelihood of selling more of a subsequent process innovation. If 
competition is intense, differentiation is preferred, but if products are already 
differentiated, firms will prefer process innovations. Differentiation is an important 
factor, which I will describe further in the section on market structure. It seems that 
independent labels are more likely to supply the market with product innovations: 
 
“The new innovative and very different musical products that have been released in 
the industry have probably come from the sub culture, or indie labels.” Yngve Næss, 
Universal Music. 
 
The results above indicate that major labels invest more in process innovation than 
in product innovation. Furthermore, it seems like independent labels invest more in 
product innovations than major labels. According to the theory above, one 
explanation is that independent labels differentiate their products to flee 
competition. I will test this in the empirical section. If they flee competition, it must 
be because it is too intense and that they do not manage to compete with major 
labels. As pointed out by Savio, EMI recruits artists from independent labels. That 
way, the independent label carries the market risk and the financial risk with the 
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product innovation, while the major label only carries the financial risk of the
process innovation. I will in the next section confirm whether these results have
support in the empirical data.
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Figure 5 All Norwegian music releases from 2000 to 2012
I will in this section give a general overview of the releases. There were released
13834 albums from Norwegian artists in the period 2000 to 2012. This number
includes all types of albums releasedon CD. The number is even higher if we include
digital releases and singles. The yearly supply has increased from 934 in 2000 to
1182 in 2012. Figure 5 clearly demonstrates a positive trend in the number of
releases.Although singles have regained importance with digital distribution (Joel
Waldfogel, 2011), they have been excluded from the study because data such as
music reviews on singles was not possible to get, as journalists rarely review singles.
The period studied is from 2006 to 2012, becausethat is the only period in which I
havedata on the hit lists. The total number of releasesis then 8008.
Figure 6 Number of releases per label ranked by size
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The list includes releases from all 3032 labels. Four of these are the major labels. 
Figure 6 draws a picture of the concentration in the industry. If the number of 
releases represented the market share in the industry, a small number of firms has a 
very large market share compared to the others. The number of labels that released 
at least one album per year from 2000 to 2012 is only 13 labels. Some labels have 
shut down while others started after 2000, but the low number of labels gives an 
indication of how many labels that stay in the industry in the longer run.  
 
A large share of the labels has only released one or two albums during the period. 
These labels are often artists releasing albums on their own label. Major labels have 
several sub-labels, depending on the genre of the music. I have therefore grouped all 
majors’ sub labels under their respective mother label. The average number of 
albums produced is two, which makes no sense to study because of the large number 
of one-man labels. We can see that the head of the tail is concentrated on a few 
labels. Second, the tail shows a relatively small number of releases per album. A 
small number of labels accounts for a large part of the album released. Interestingly, 
none of the major labels holds the top position in the number of releases. The label 
with most releases is the independent label Tylden. Second comes Universal, 
followed by Sony and EMI. Tylden is an independent Norwegian label that releases 
dance band music (Tylden, 2013). The firm was established in 1994 and initially 
distributed their records through Universal. When Universal, together with the other 
major labels moved most of their distribution storage facilities to Sweden, they 
established their own distribution firm together with some other independent labels 
(Tylden, 2013). Despite the large number of releases, I will treat Tylden as an 
independent label because they have no international activity on the same level as 
the majors.  
*
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Table 3 Reviews 
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The list contains reviews of 2035 albums from 2000 to 2012, but only the period 
from 2006 to 2012 will be studied because I have no data on the hit list from 2000 to 
2005. The number of reviews is therefore limited to 1199. The data is the average 
score given by one or more newspapers and magazines. The mean is 6,80, which 
means that most albums that are reviewed get a positive rating.  
 
Music reviews have played a crucial role in the same way radio had on breaking 
artists in the market. An album review could be a “make it or break it” for many 
artists. A bad review does not mean the project is dead, but it requires more work 
from the artist to demonstrate the quality of its music. With music available online, 
this has changed. Universal and EMI agree that reviews are still important, but they 
do not dictate the future stars in the industry. 
 
“The effect is not as strong today as it was earlier. People can listen to the song on 
any streaming service and make up their own opinion at the same time the review 
is published”, Yngve Næss, A&R Executive Universal 
 
Consumers were unable to verify the quality of an album until after they purchased 
the album in the physical age. Reviews therefore served as a sales pitch for new 
albums. With streaming services, consumers can make up their own opinion once the 
album is released. If they only like a few songs on the album, they are not forced to 
buy the entire album to listen to the songs they like. The effect of the score on the 
scale seems to give different effects. Both extremes of the scale can capture listeners’ 
attention: 
 
 “It can stop everything. 31 is the most boring rating. It doesn’t say anything about 
a release. Getting 1 can give two opposite effects. It stops everything or it gets 
people’s attention. Getting a score of 1 and a full page in a newspaper catches the 
listeners’ attention”. Jarle Savio, A&R Executive EMI Music. 
 
The debut album of the band Departure is a great example of a band that may have 
benefited from a bad release. The album was rated 1 out of 6 in the Norwegian radio 
                                                   
1 Norwegian album reviews are most often rated between 1 and 6, where 1 is the lowest score and 6 is 
the highest. 
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station NRK P3. The review was published on the radio station’s website with the 
title “Cut my ears off”, referring to the horrible quality of the album that made the 
journalist say he preferred to cut his ears off rather than listen to their music. It 
obviously attracted several readers that had to hear the album (Klev, 2013). Reviews 
have a promotional effect, but the effect depends on the type of music and how 
established the artist is.  
 
“Sissel Kyrkjebø is an established artist with broad audience and has released 
albums since she was 18 years old. But her audience needs to know that she 
released an album. If no one tells them, they won’t necessarily look for her new 
album”, Yngve Næss, A&R Executive, Universal Music 
 
Established artists that have released music most of the audience is familiar with 
have to convince the audience to buy the new album. If the seventh or eight album 
receives a bad review, people may think that they already have the first six albums, so 
they do not need to buy the seventh, especially since it received a bad rating.  
 
“Do you need one more Springsteen album when you already have 14? The fans 
would die to get the 15th album. Some others wouldn’t care”, Yngve Næss, A&R 
Executive Universal Music 
 
There is no clear effect on how reviews affect the popularity of an album. For some 
artists it is an important promotional tool while for others, reviews have less effect. 
Digital distribution has made it easier for the consumer to check whether they agree 
or disagree with the review, and a bad review today does not necessarily mean that 
the project is a failure.  
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Table 4: VG-lista overview 
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A general overview of the data (table 4) shows that the average number of weeks an 
album stays on the list is 7,7 weeks. The average number does not tell us much, as the 
dispersion is relatively large. The median number is 4 weeks, which means that most 
of the albums that are listed only stay for a short period of time, while a few stay very 
long and pull up the average. 90 percent of the releases stay on the list less than 20 
weeks. The maximum number on the list is 62 weeks, but only one album reached 
that high. The label that occur most frequently on the list is Universal. From 2006 to 
2012, Universal had 68 albums on the list, Sony had 63, Tylden had 56, EMI had 43 
and Warner had 34. There are 502 labels that have one or more albums listed on VG-
lista. To measure each label’s success, I could create a relative sales success ratio. If !! is the total number of albums released per label, l, and !! is the total number of 
albums listed on VG-lista per label, the success rate !! for each label in terms of sales 
such that !! = !!!!. However, this measure would favor independent labels with very 
few releases. There are some independent labels whose one and only release has 
been listed on VG-lista. They will therefore receive a 100 percent success rate, so the 
method is not appropriate as the labels differ so significantly in size and 
characteristics. If I only take into account the ten largest labels measured by albums 
released, the ratio makes more sense, but the measure neglects the performance of 
each album. Being listed on VG-lista does not say how the album performed 
compared to the other albums that were listed. This should be taken into account so I 
created a hit list ratio as mentioned in the methodology chapter.  
 
The average album ratios can be found in appendix 10.1. Labels with the highest 
ratios are independent labels, but so are also the labels with the lowest ratios. An 
important observation to outline is that most of the independent labels in the top 
position only have released one album, or they have only had one album on the hit 
list. The large number of independent labels ranked in the top positions indicates 
that it is possible to release an album and attain a high score on the hit lists without 
the help of a major label. The VG score ratio will be used in the next section where I 
use a logistic regression to measure the relationship between market structure and 
innovation. 
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This section contains the results from the empirical study where I study the 
relationship between innovation and market structure.   
 
In table 5, I have lined up innovation for the two types of labels. The table shows all 
releases from 2000 to 2012, releases from 2006 to 2012 and a filtered set of albums 
that have either been reviewed or been listed on the hit list from 2006 to 2012. For 
both types of label, there are more process innovations than product innovations. 
This can be found by tallying the row sums and comparing them. The results make 
sense. If labels were to invest more in product innovation than in process innovation, 
it would mean that they would only produce one album for most of their artists. 
Universal and EMI expressed in the previous section that labels have to release a 
process innovation in order to recoup the investment of the product innovation. 
Overall, independent labels release more albums than majors, but the proportion of 
process innovation to product innovation is higher for major labels versus 
independent labels for each segmentation (2000-2012, 2006-2012, and quality). The 
majors’ ratio is about 2 to 1 for the unfiltered lists and 3 to 1 for the filtered list. I 
performed a Chi-square test to assess the independence between the variables. This 
was done to see whether it makes sense to study the relationship between the 
variables. The results from the test can be found in appendix 10.2.1. According to the 
test, the variables are dependent, which means that label is a factor in determining if 
an album will be a process or a product innovation. 
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Table 5 The number of innovations by the type of label. Innovations over the total period and 
innovations over the period there is data on reviews and hit list. 
 
In the following analysis, I will only use the numbers from 2006 to 2012. I first 
performed a t-test to look for any differences in the proportion between the 
investments of major labels and independent labels. The results can be found in 
appendix 10.4. I tested the null hypothesis saying that means of the samples are 
equal. The alternative hypothesis is that they are not. Based on the results, we can 
reject the null hypothesis. The mean for group 0, which is the group of independent 
labels shows a mean of 0,48, while group 1 which represents the major labels shows a 
mean of 0,26, and the results are statistically significant. On average, 48 of every 100 
albums from an independent label are new artist releases, where as for major labels 
only 26 of every 100 albums are new product innovations. Therefore, independent 
labels are releasing nearly twice as many new artist product innovations than major 
labels. The problem with a t-test is that it does not take into account other variables 
that may explain the dependent variable. Therefore, I will use a logistic regression to 
account for other variables. 
 
The dependent variable of a logistic regression is a binary variable that takes the 
value 1 or 0. If the value is 1, it means the innovation is a product innovation. If it is 
0, it means the album is a process innovation. I am aware of the false dichotomy 
fallacy. This will be explained under section 7.4 Limitations and future research. 
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Appendix 10.5.1 includes the regression results for all albums released between 2006 
and 2012. The odds ratio measures how much more major labels invest in product 
innovations than independent labels. If the odds ratio is below 1, it means that major 
labels invest less in product innovations than independent labels. For the variable on 
label type, we get an odds ratio of 0,46. The ratio is statistically significant with p-
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values equal to zero. These results support the t-test. Independent labels are 2.1739 
(=1/0,46) times more likely to invest in a product innovation than the major labels. 
The dummy variables for year 2006, 2007, 2010 and 2012 are not significant because 
of collinearity between the variables. The odds ratio for reviews is 0,91 and the odds 
ratio for the VG-lista score is 0,869. Both the latter odds ratios are statistically 
significant. However, I discovered that these numbers do not tell my much. I did a 
new regression with a dummy variable for whether an album had been listed on VG-
lista and a dummy for whether the album had been reviewed. The results are shown 
in appendix 10.5.2. The odds ratio for the type of label has not changed much, 0,48. 
The odds ratio for being listed on the hit list is 0,61 and the odds ratio being reviewed 
is 0,55. The interpretation of the odds ratios is that not being reviewed makes it 1,82 
(=1/0,55) times more likely that the album is a product innovation, not being listed 
makes it 1,63 (=1/0,61) times more likely that the album is a product innovation.  
 
It could be useful to check whether there is any collinearity between these two 
variables. It is reasonable to believe that albums that are listen on VG-lista are more 
likely to also be reviewed by a newspaper. I did two simple correlations. The first 
between the dummy variables for being reviewed and for being listed on the hit list. 
The results can be found in appendix 10.3.2, and shows a correlation of 0.32. The 
correlation is positive, but not very strong. The second correlation is between the hit 
list score and the review score. The result can be found in appendix 10.3.1, and shows 
a correlation of 0,19, which is relatively low. A higher score on the hit list does not 
necessarily mean it has received a good rating, but the results may be affected by the 
fact that I have included all albums from 2006 to 2012. Based on the two 
correlations, I cannot draw any conclusions on the relationship between reviews and 
the hit lists because the results are not strong. 
 
The marginal effects in a logistic regression measure how much the odds variable 
change with an increase in the variable of 1. The marginal effect of the coefficient for 
the type of label is -0,181. This means that if the variable increases from 0 to 1, 
meaning that we switch from an independent label to a major label, the odds of the 
album being a product innovation decreases by 0,181. I did a second regression on 
the filtered list to see if that would change the results. The odds ratio for the type of 
label is 0,64, which means that the independent labels are 1,563 (=1/0,64) times 
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more likely to invest in product innovation than major labels. The other factors 
remain as in the first regression. What we see is that when we take into account the 
fact that an album has been rated as quality, the proportion changes, as the several of 
the one-man labels have been filtered out. But the independent labels are still more 
likely to invest in product innovations than major labels.  
 
The results that major labels invest more in process innovations than product 
innovations were expected. If major labels would invest more in product innovations, 
they would have to frequently change the pool of artists. It is easier for labels to 
predict the outcome of a process innovation than a product innovation, as they 
already have information on the audience. The interesting results from this section is 
that independent labels invest at least two times more in product innovations than 
major labels. When I use the filtered list, the independent labels invest 50 percent 
more. These results confirm what was expressed by EMI and Universal in the section 
on process and product innovation; most product innovations come from 
independent labels. The following section on the market structure may help explain 
why we see this trend. 
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This section will describe the independent variables of the market structure that may 
explain why we see that independent labels are two times more likely to invest in 
product innovations than major labels.  
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The market seems to recover from the drop in sales during the first ten years of the 
millennia. Consumers are getting more willing to pay for music as a product, and 
producing music is again becoming profitable, according to EMI Music and 
Universal Music. Profits are lower than they used to be, but it is possible to release 
music and make money on it. EMI and Universal are unisonous on that the market 
for new music has not been better in many years.  
 
“The market is very good. There has never been listened to more music today than 
before”, A&R Executive, EMI Music 
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“The market for Norwegian music is good. We have more releases in 2012 and 2013 
than in many years, but it is more challenging to reach the audience”, A&R 
Executive Universal Music Norway. 
 
EMI describes the demand side of the market while Universal describes the supply 
side. As there have never been listened to more music, demand has never been 
higher. If demand has never been higher, it is reasonable to believe that supply has 
increased as well to meet the demand of the consumers, unless prices have increased. 
The latter is unreasonable as physical sales have dropped significantly and digital 
sales are becoming the primary source of music sales, which charge a significantly 
lower unit price (IFPI, 2013a). Yngve Næss at Universal confirms that the supply has 
increased, although the numbers in our study show otherwise. But, total supply of 
Norwegian music has increased from 2000 to 2012. The largest drop in the number 
of releases occurred during 2002, but over the period, the yearly supply of new 
albums has increased by 41,6% over 12 years. The significant increase is due to the 
increase in independent labels. Jarle Savio says EMI experiences an increase in the 
supply of demos they receive from unsigned artists, which he says is affected by lots 
of noise:  
 
“The challenge is that there is lots of noise. Since everyone can produce a song on 
their own computer, there is produced a lot of crap. But the market for releasing 
new music is good”, Jarle Savio, A&R Executive, EMI Music. 
 
The barriers to record music have decreased. Cheaper technology has made it easier 
for consumers to produce and release their own content. EMI has opened a 
Soundcloud account where anyone can submit his or her music. Soundcloud is a 
service that allows users to upload music content that becomes available to the public 
for free. It is being used by several artists, especially young artists, and is very 
popular for DJs and artists that make remixes of other songs (Soundcloud, 2013). 
However, decreasing barriers to record do not seem to have increased quality: 
 
“99% of the content is crap because everyone can record a demo. Since it’s so easy 
to record an album, the quality decreases”.  
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It is important to distinguish between home production and professional production. 
Very few home productions will be released without being re-recorded in a 
professional studio. Cheaper technology has made it easier for labels to discover new 
talent, but it has also created more noise, making it more difficult to find talent.  
 
So far, it seems like the Norwegian music market is good. The major labels have 
started to make money again on their music. The next section will present the 
concentration in the industry. 
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“I do not feel we’re in direct competition with the other major labels. The industry is 
so small that I see the others more as colleagues.” Yngve Næss, A&R Executive 
Universal Music. 
 
Although Næss may not perceive labels as competing with each other, their artists 
are competing for consumers’ attention. With an increasing number of artists, the 
competition has become more intense.  
 
“Streaming platforms treat artists equally. It is therefore more challenging for 
Norwegian releases to compete with international releases, as the international 
releases most often generate far more streams than Norwegian music”, Yngve 
Næss, A&R Executive Universal Music. 
 
Streaming treats artists equally. Quantity has become more important with the 
digital downloading and streaming services, not only for mainstream artists, but also 
niche artists. The price of an album is fixed, and is set by either the record store or 
the digital intermediary. With marginal costs approaching zero, quantity is becoming 
more important. It is reasonable to believe that consumers have a certain limit on 
how much music they can consume. As artists require consumers to listen to more of 
their music, competition for the consumers becomes more intense. The odds will 
naturally be in favor of the artists with a broader appeal. 
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Streaming services are known for paying low fees to artists. The fee system has 
created large debates in the Norwegian music industry, especially among 
independent labels. The streaming services pay very little per stream, and for artists 
that do not make music that is streamed in large quantity, streaming services pay an 
poor salary to artists compared to the CD. Because quantity is important on 
streaming services, major labels have a competitive advantage over independent 
labels because they can benefit from a large catalogue. Economies of scale in the 
music industry may never have been as important as today. EMI and Universal 
stated in the previous section that the market for music is very good. The 
independent labels however feel it is very difficult to survive as the profits from 
streaming is very low (Hillestad, 2012). Some independent labels have even chosen 
to withdraw their catalogue from the streaming services because they are not able to 
recoup the investment in new music with the fees streaming services generate 
(Rognerød, 2012). Streaming has made the competitive environment more intense. 
However, major labels seem to be protected from the competition to a certain degree, 
as they can benefit from having a large catalogue. It is easy to have your music 
distributed on streaming services, but it is difficult to make money unless you get a 
large amount of streams.  
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 “Earlier, we could pay to get a success. Today, we have to work for it”. Jarle Savio, 
A&R Executive EMI Music. 
 
Marketing and selling music in the physical age may have been easier if you were a 
large label with a large catalogue and access to capital. As pointed out by Savio above, 
a success depended on the level of investment. Only the large labels were able to use 
television commercials for album releases because of the large costs. Television was 
one of the most efficient marketing channels, and albums promoted on television got 
significantly more publicity than the other albums. If you had the resources to pay 
for television commercials and the access to radio stations, you had greater chance of 
succeeding with your releases. Technology has changed that. First, the profit 
potential through streaming and downloading has changed. Digital sales do not 
generate the same level of profits as physical sales, so the large cost for the television 
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commercials cannot be justified. Second, alternative marketing channels through 
Internet and social media have gained importance.  
 
“We have almost stopped with TV-commercials”, Jarle Savio, A&R Executive, EMI 
Music.  
 
This trend should benefit independent labels. Television commercials were perceived 
as the primary way to break an artist in the market in 2001 (Holen, 2001). It was 
easier to promote an album in the physical age because the audience could not know 
the quality of the album until after the purchase. Streaming makes the market 
transparent, and consumers can observe the quality right away.  
 
Advertising through social media is becoming more important for record labels. It is 
more democratic, as everyone has the same initial opportunity to reach the same 
audience for a very low price. As pointed out in Chapter 2, major labels and radio 
stations were the gatekeepers between artists and consumers. Internet and social 
media changed that. In theory, anyone has equal opportunity to reach the same 
number of audience through Internet and social media. However, as the barriers to 
reach an audience are lowered, more artists compete for the same audience. In 
theory, labels compete on equal terms with the artist that just recorded an album in 
his living room. Universal and EMI agree that it has become harder to reach the 
audience, but there are certain benefits of marketing several releases than only one, 
as you build up knowledge on what works and what does not work. I will describe 
this further in the section on research capabilities. 
 
 
Barriers to Entry in Production 
I already made the distinction between a professional production and a home 
production. The latter has become much easier. But the cost of producing a 
professional album in a studio has remained at the same level. Most of the costs 
related to producing a professional album is labor cost, such as hiring producers, 
musicians and mastering of the record. Universal gave this example of a possible cost 
structure: 
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“Most releases cost between 200 000 to 350 000 NOK. This includes production, 
mastering and hiring musicians. It is possible to record an album for less. Indie 
labels may be able to record an album for 75 000 to 150 000.” 
 
On top of that comes marketing and promotion. Fixed costs normally do not affect 
incentives to innovate. However, they can act as a barrier to entry for competitors. If 
the costs above represent the costs of breaking an artist in the Norwegian market, by 
definition the barriers to entry, independent labels with limited access to capital may 
try to find alternative methods to produce an album to reduce the costs, or 
differentiate the music so that is does not compete directly with the major labels. 
 
From the theory chapter, we saw that when barriers to entry are high, monopolists 
are less likely to invest in innovations because they are naturally protected from 
competition, and the investment would incur a replacement effect on the old 
technology. If the model holds, we would expect to see a lower degree of innovation 
from major labels in the period of the physical age. From what we saw from the 
supply of new music, the supply trend from major labels was negative from 2000 to 
2012, while the independent labels increased their supply. The barriers to produce, 
distribute, promote and market music have decreased. Lower barriers have increased 
the number of labels in the market. With more labels come more competition, but it 
seems like the major labels are sheltered from competition. So far, streaming is 
mostly profitable for major labels because they benefit of a large catalogue that 
generates millions of streams.  
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There is considerable risk involved in investing in music, and technology seems to 
have increased the riskiness of investments. 
 
 “The investment is maybe fully financed up to 24 months after the release. In the 
CD-era, the investment could be fully recouped after only two to four weeks”, Jarle 
Savio, A&R Executive EMI Music.  
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It takes more time before an investment is fully recouped, which can create cash flow 
challenges, especially for smaller labels. 
 
“For us that have a large catalogue, cash flow is not a problem, but for Indie labels, 
cash flow is a problem. Indies’ strategy has been to produce an album, release it 
and hopefully sell 1000 units, which is the break-even for most albums. The revenue 
from every album is invested in the next album, and this is how Indies normally do 
it. It’s not a million dollar business, but that is not their goal. Once an investment is 
recouped, they invest in the next. And since the recoupment now takes longer time, 
it creates cash flow problems for indie labels. Right now, it’s tougher for them”, 
Jarle Savio, A&R Executive, EMI Music.  
 
Universal agrees with EMI that cash flow is not a problem for them. For the small 
labels that are run by one or two passionate people with limited finances, cash flow 
constraints pose a problem. It either forces the labels to reduce investments or find 
alternative methods to release content. Cash flow challenges may explain the 
increase in singles and EPs, as it allows the label to see the consumers’ demand 
before investing in an entire album.  
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“We realized some years ago that if we wanted to survive in the new music 
industry, we had to acknowledge that we are a knowledge firm”. Jarle Savio, A&R 
Executive EMI Music. 
 
Technology has been disruptive to the record industry in several ways. Napster was a 
catalyst that put all labels on the sideline. Major labels did not have the knowledge to 
respond to the technological progression and were therefore trying the best they 
could to protect their position by counteracting file sharing. However, it seems like 
they are recovering and are building new structures that allows them to respond 
faster to market changes: 
 
“Several employees had to go. But the ones who stayed changed. We hired several 
new young employees that were willing to change the company, and we succeeded. 
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We just delivered the best numbers since 1969 in Norway”. Jarle Savio, A&R 
executive, EMI Music. 
 
Savio explains how EMI Music went through the years of decreasing music revenues. 
Few of their employees had any technology knowledge, and they had to hire new 
people to be able to understand how technology would transform the industry in the 
future. Building up internal knowledge may explain EMI’s recent increase in profits. 
They have focused on building an organisation that acquires knowledge about the 
new music environment. They are using new tools to measure how people consume 
music and measure what makes a project successful. I was interested to know 
whether there were any tasks they did not do themselves. Savio mentioned there was 
a trend some years ago that labels outsourced promotion: 
 
“…that was not a good idea, especially digital promotion. If we outsource 
promotion, we won’t learn anything about it. Then it ‘s better to hire more people to 
do it in-house instead of paying someone else to learn what we could learn”, A&R 
Executive, EMI Music. 
 
Research capabilities refer to how capable a firm is to capture information about the 
market, their consumers and technological trends that they can transform into new 
innovate products. According to Christensen (2013), established firms with large 
market power are better positioned to undertake sustaining innovations because they 
have more information about the market and can react to competitors’ moves faster 
than others. They also have the economies of scale that enables them to produce 
more efficiently than entrants. EMI fits Christensen’s description. The trend that 
they have started to capture information about its consumers and the market would 
allow them to perform more precise process innovations in the future and increase 
the likelihood of success. I do not have enough data to measure the difference in total 
profits for EMI between 2000 and 2012, but as the number of releases in 2000 was 
33 and the number of releases in 2012 was 12, knowing that 2012 was their best year 
since 1969, their profits per album have increased. Whether this is because they are 
actually more efficient or if it is because they are making more profits on their old 
catalogue is hard to know. But building up knowledge on the market and the 
consumers allow them to profit more from their catalogue.  
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I cannot generalize EMI’s experience to the other three major labels, but EMI seems 
to build up a structure within their label that allows them to acquire more knowledge 
about their operations, which can foster more process innovations. This may seem as 
a profitable strategy, and may become even more important in the following years. 
Independent labels are smaller and may not operate on the same professional level 
as major labels: 
 
“People who start indie labels have a passion for music, but since the labels are 
small, they have little flexibility if their life situation change or they need stable 
income.” Yngve Næss, A&R Executive Universal Music. 
 
The structure of an independent label can make it difficult to survive in the long run. 
However, it seems like they possess other capabilities that major labels do not have: 
 
“In terms of profits, we generate far more profits than any of the other labels in 
Norway. But in terms of creativity, indie labels have several competencies and may 
work more closely with the artist to create very good musical products. The fact 
that they often have limited capital also shows that they manage to create in 
several occasions better products than us, but with less capital. People that work in 
indie labels are valuable, and they are often attractive for us to hire.” Yngve Næss, 
A&R Executive Universal Music. 
 
Næss acknowledges that independent labels have certain capabilities that allow them 
to create new musical products that outperform major labels in some way: 
 
“The new innovative and very different musical products that have been released in 
the industry have probably come from the sub culture, or indie labels.” Yngve Næss, 
Universal Music. 
  
Major labels seem to build a structure that allows them to acquire knowledge about 
the market and their consumers so that they can release new and more precise 
process innovations that allows them to reap larger profits. Independent labels 
however have a different set of knowledge that allows them to challenge the major 
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labels on music quality and discover talent major labels cannot find. The lack of 
capital, access to promotion and advertising channels and organisation structure 
may explain their difficulty of boosting the artist’s career in the long run, and artists 
may therefore switch label after a an album or two.  
 
“Many artists start their career in an indie label before being picked up by a major 
label.” Yngve Næss, Universal Music. 
 
This may explain why the independent labels invest more in product innovations 
than major labels.  
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The respondents define innovation in the music industry as finding, producing and 
releasing talents to the market. Every new process innovation increases the streams 
of older content, which creates an additional profit incentive to undertake process 
innovations. Major labels prefer to invest in artists that have previous experience 
with another label, or released music on their own as a way to reduce risk. The 
empirical part shows two things. First, major and independent labels invest more in 
process innovations than product innovations. This is normal, or else they would 
have to replace their pool of artists after every release. Second, independent labels 
are two times more likely to undertake product innovations than major labels. If I 
use the filtered quality list, the number is 1,5. This is interesting because the 
respondents express that several of their new artists come from independent labels. 
If that is a trend, then independent labels account for the product innovations while 
major labels benefit from the process innovations.  
 
The second part of the results describes the market structure. The market structure 
in the record industry can be defined by lower barriers to entry in production, 
distribution, promotion and marketing of music. There is an increasing number of 
labels, thus increasing intensity. Major labels report on larger revenues while 
independent labels struggle to make money on digital streaming. Major labels benefit 
from economies of scale, and their large catalogue gives them a competitive 
advantage over independent labels. Streaming has increased the recoupment time 
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for album investments, making it tougher for independent labels to rely solely on 
sales revenues. While majors’ overall position is somewhat protected because of their 
large catalogue, they have to compete on equal terms in marketing and promotion of 
music.  
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7 Discussion and implications 
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The research question of this thesis is to explain how market structure affects the 
incentives to innovate in the Norwegian music industry. I will in this section relate 
the results to the theoretical framework from Chapter 3.  
U.-.- N:,34H+:>%&!%08*'$'2C&
I will first distinguish between how technology has been disruptive to the industry’s 
value chain and innovation in the music industry. New technology is also innovation 
in the music industry, but it can be seen as an external innovation while the release 
of new music can be seen as internal innovation. The introduction of radical 
technology relates to Christensen’s (2013) model on disruptive innovations while the 
production of process and product innovation relates to the theories on market 
structure and incentives to innovate. Figure 7 below is an updated version of Figure 3 
in the theory section, with technology as an external innovation that affects the 
market structure. Since the technological inventions that have disrupted the industry 
did not come from the industry itself, I have illustrated them as external. However, 
as demonstrated by the figure, the innovation affects the market structure, which 
eventually goes on to affect the release of new product and process innovations in 
new music.  
 
Figure 7 Market structure and the incentives to innovate with technology 
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The music industry has been defined as an oligopoly with a few large labels that 
dominates the market and several small labels. The large labels have had significant 
market power for a long period of time, but I have throughout the thesis pointed out 
how technology has disrupted all the parts of the value chain and tried to see whether 
this has affected the market power of the labels. To conclude that technology has put 
the major labels on the sideline is too easy, and not necessarily true. I earlier said 
that because they failed to react to the technological development in the distribution 
of music, they lost the profitable distribution chain. This is partly true. Distribution is 
still done through the company, but the new streaming and downloading services 
have taken over the delivery of the product to the final consumer. The situation is the 
same as in the physical era, except that there are no transportation cost and 
reproduction cost. However, the major labels have bought stocks in Spotify, and 
control around 19% of the company (Jerräng, 2009). This means that they now 
control a fifth part of the value chain, consumption. They can gain insight in what 
consumers listen to, what music they like, and how they listen to music. Streaming 
services also offer this service to independent labels, but the major labels have an 
ownership in the streaming services that allows them to keep control of the entire 
value chain. Because of their significant size, they have this opportunity to regain 
control over distribution by buying their way back into position. The total effect of 
new technological innovations is ambiguous. In some cases, it has decreased the 
barriers to entry so that new labels can enter more easily. More competition 
decreases monopoly power and is assumed to benefit consumers. On the other hand, 
it has increased the importance of economies of scale, and the major labels’ position 
seems to have remained stable. I will go more into how the changes in the market 
structure affects the incentives to innovate and relate it to the theoretical models. 
 
Major labels share the characteristics of monopolists in that they are large firms with 
easy access to capital and a solid structure that enables them to benefit from 
economies of scale. On the other hand, they are slow in responding to new 
innovations that fall outside the existing knowledge within the firm. As pointed out 
by Henderson (1993), incumbents have built up an organizational structure that 
enables them to capture information about their existing operations. They can easily 
react to changes in the market, but the knowledge is at the same time a barrier to 
invent new innovations that carries different characteristics than what they are 
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already familiar with. Napster was a disruptive innovation that fell outside the 
existing knowledge of the major labels. When Napster was launched, the major labels 
did not see Napster as a threat to the industry, but more as an illegal service they 
wanted to shut down as soon as possible. They did not see the new value chain 
Napster brought into the market. The story fits Christensen’s (2013) definition of a 
disruptive innovation. Incumbents do not acknowledge the newcomer as a threat 
until it becomes so big that it is unavoidable. Then it is too late to respond, because 
the newcomer has launched a product or a service that becomes the standard in the 
industry, and the incumbents already lie far behind to be able to respond the new the 
competitive environment. There were no single label that came after Napster and 
used their technology to distribute music to consumers, but several. As Napster had 
created a market for digital music that replaced the physical CD sales, the labels that 
took advantage of this technology should be able to capture market shares from the 
major labels as consumers shifted to a digital platform and major labels were too 
slow to respond to the new technology. This would be true in the music industry if 
Arrow’s (1976) replacement effect would be present. Arrow assumed that every new 
innovation implies a replacement effect on existing technology, in the sense that new 
technology makes old technology obsolete. Digital distribution replaced physical 
distribution, meaning that digital distribution became the preferred platform for 
consumers. However, if the replacement effect is present in the production of new 
music, product or process innovations, it means that every new album release would 
replace an old release. With increasing competition, we would expect to see 
independent labels capturing market shares from major labels, since they adapted 
more quickly to the new platform and supplied music on a platform consumers 
preferred. This would assume the quality of all releases is equal, but they are not. 
While the replacement effect is present in the distribution of music, it is unrealistic 
to assume the replacement effect is present in the production of new music. The 
absence of the replacement effect can explain why major labels have maintained 
their large market share. Furthermore, consumers have a limitation in how many 
artists they can listen to, and they prefer to listen to music they are already familiar 
with. For labels with a catalogue containing music consumers like, this is positive, 
especially if it is large and dominates the market, as they have the opportunity to 
supply the music on their own terms. Copyright gives the label monopoly power in 
the supply of their product. With no replacement effect in new music, copyright helps 
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major labels maintain their position in the market as long as there is a demand for 
their products. 
 
The reasoning above assumes that music does not depreciate and that major labels 
do not need to invest in new music. However, music does depreciate (Joel Waldfogel, 
2011). Consumers have a preference towards new music. The majors’ catalogue will 
therefore depreciate, and it is necessary to invest in new music to maintain the 
market share. The absence of the replacement effect and copyright seem to be two 
factors that can explain how they have kept their market share throughout the 
disruptive period of the industry, as well as the fact that they have bought their way 
into the streaming services. However, the catalogue has been built up over several 
years. As they have decreased their investments in new music the last years because 
of reducing profitability, this may hurt the firm in the long run. Today’s process 
innovations are the result of earlier product innovations. If the number of future 
product innovations decreases, it will lead to a lower number of process innovations, 
unless the major label purchases artists from independent labels.  
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The disruption has led to a decrease in barriers to enter the industry and more firms 
have entered the market. The numbers of yearly albums released and the number of 
labels have increased, and it is reasonable to say that competition has become more 
intense. In Gilbert and Newberry’s (1982) model on monopolies threatened by entry, 
the monopolist will invest more in process innovations to deter entry from the 
competitors. If entry barriers are high, the monopolist’s incentives to undertake 
innovation investments are lower than if the entry barriers are low. I assume the 
major labels act as monopolists and that independent labels are entrants. As 
technology has decreased the barriers to enter the industry, this would imply 
increasing incentives for major labels to invest in process innovations. The model 
assumes that the monopolist and the competitor compete for the innovation through 
a bidding process. The label that places the highest bid will get the innovation, which 
will according to the model be the major label. If the model holds, we would see an 
increase in the supply of new process innovations from major labels. What we see is 
the opposite. Major labels have decreased their investments in new albums, process 
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and product innovations. However, they seem to have become more efficient. The 
model assumes the replacement effect is present, which may be the reason we do not 
see any increase in process innovations from major labels. The model may not be 
appropriate to describe innovation in the music industry. First of all, because it 
assumes the replacement effect, second because it does not take into account product 
innovations, except saying that product innovations would also generate a 
replacement effect for entrants as well as monopolists. The incentive to maintain 
market share can therefore not be confirmed in this case. Another factor that may 
explain majors’ preference towards process innovations are research capabilities. 
 
Henderson’s (1993) theory on research capabilities say that monopolists are better 
positioned to undertake process innovations because they have built organizational 
structures that captures information about the market and the consumers. Major 
labels seem to build structures that allow them to capture more information about 
the market and their consumers. Furthermore, they have the economies of scale and 
a long history that have provided them with deep knowledge about how to release 
and make money on music. They would therefore have a competitive advantage in 
process innovations. This reasoning follows the model of Christensen (2013) and 
Schumpeter (1942). However, the same accumulated knowledge creates 
disadvantages in releasing product innovations. Independent labels have a different 
set of skills that allows them come up with new radical music artists that are 
differentiated from the products of the major labels. They are not bound by 
organizational structure that reduce their creativity. According to Christensen 
(2013), entrants should only compete with major labels on process innovations in the 
case where the innovation requires a set of skills that are hard to copy and if the 
entrant has a competitive advantage in producing and supplying the innovative 
product. If not, they will be outperformed by incumbents. Following Weiss (2003) 
model, if we assume there were two separate markets where all new entrants 
produced product innovations while major firms produced process innovations, 
independent labels would prefer to join the market for process innovations in order 
to flee competition from the other labels because differentiation among independent 
labels are already high. However, the independent labels that compete on process 
innovations will see that they are quickly outperformed by major labels because 
major labels have competitive advantage in releasing process innovations. As I 
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demonstrated in the previous chapter, independent labels lack access to capital, an 
organizational that acquires knowledge about its consumers, and access to 
promotion and advertising channels. The ones that compete with major labels on 
process innovations will face low profits and intense competition because 
competition is based on quantity, and require larger efforts and financials to invest in 
marketing and promotion to get the required level of quantity for the innovation to 
become profitable. Instead, they may release product innovations and benefit from 
differentiating the product from the most popular music and sell it with additional 
services and merchandise. The downside of mainly investing in product innovations 
is that they generate less profit than process innovations, although they include an 
option for subsequent product innovations. How independent labels manage to 
survive by primarily targeting product innovations is not answered in this thesis. If 
the products are differentiated from mainstream popular music, they are more likely 
to receive government funding for recording an album than major albums releasing 
popular music. Furthermore, independent labels may gain from other sources of 
revenue in the record deals, such as live revenues.  
 
The reasoning above outlines two different investment approaches in the industry: 
The objective for all labels is to release a product in the market with an innovative 
sound. The major labels will benefit from the first innovation by releasing multiple 
subsequent process innovations that allow him to benefit from diminishing cost. The 
independent label will release the first album, but cannot compete in the market for 
the second album because of lack of capital, less access to promotion channels and a 
small existing catalogue. The independent label will therefore continue to stay 
competitive by target the sub culture and re-segmenting their portion of the market 
while major labels reap the larger benefits from process innovations.  
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Empirical results have so far failed to support either monopoly markets or 
competitive markets as the most optimal to foster innovation. One possible 
explanation as I outlined in the theory chapter is the lack of common measures of 
innovation. Given that major labels are monopolists and independent labels are 
firms in competitive markets, this study shows that monopolists focus more on 
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process innovations than competitors. This supports Christensen’s (2013) theory on 
disruptive innovations and Henderson’s (1993) theory on research capabilities. My 
results do not show that monopolists increase investments in innovation when they 
are threatened by entry, Gilbert & Newberry’s (1982) propose. There may be several 
reasons for the lack of support. The threat of entry may not be credible. If major 
labels do not consider the entry of new labels as a threat, they will not invest more in 
process innovations. Furthermore, I have excluded the replacement effect. Including 
it would increase major labels’ incentives to innovate. They would gain from the new 
innovations, but they would at the same time replace the existing innovation. The 
general models however only takes into consideration process innovation. Product 
innovation can be included in Gilbert & Newberry’s (1982) model, but this would 
only mean that the replacement effect would be present for monopolists as well as 
entrants. Weiss (2003) and Ebina & Shimizu’s (2008) models are better to explain 
the incentives to innovate, because they both take into account product innovations.  
 
The interesting theoretical implication in this thesis is what I have termed as the 
catalyst effect. It is the opposite effect of the replacement effect, meaning that every 
new process innovation increases the value of the existing products. Firms with an 
existing portfolio of products are more likely to undertake process innovations rather 
than product innovations because process innovations generate profits not only on 
the new product, but also on the existing portfolio. Both innovations imply financial 
risk, but process innovation does not have the same level of market risk as a product 
innovation. However, the catalogue cannot maintain the same value for an unlimited 
future, so it is reasonable to assume that it depreciates over time. Following Ebina & 
Shimizu’s (2008) model, product innovations include the option to benefit from 
future process innovations if the first innovation is successful. The balance between 
investments in product and process innovations determines the long-term profit to 
the firm, as the firm has to release product innovations to add value to their product 
portfolio. 
 
Whether these findings can be generalized to other industries remains to be 
researched further. The firm may be able to vertically differentiate the new and the 
old product to divide consumers after their willingness to pay. When Apple launches 
a new iPhone, they do not scrap the old model, but they reduce the hard drive storage 
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on the phone and decrease its price. That way, they target two segments of the 
market according to consumers’ willingness to pay and sell more units than if they 
only sold the new product.  
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The major labels seem to have adapted to digital distribution. They have more to gain 
from process innovations, and streaming makes process innovations even more 
profitable because of the catalyst effect a new release has on existing content. The 
effect also applies to independent labels, but profits from streaming is still so low 
that with only a few releases in their catalogue, independent labels will either 
decrease the investments in an album or find alternative methods to sell and 
distribute music than through the standard streaming services. Niche artists have a 
different audience that may be willing to pay more for the music. Furthermore, niche 
music is more likely to receive government subsidies than popular music. As long as 
profits from streaming remain low, government subsidies create an incentive to 
differentiate music as it reduces the risk of investing in a new album.  
 
The industry is in a hybrid phase with both physical and digital distribution. How the 
situation becomes when only distribution is digital is difficult to say. According to the 
participants in the interview, the largest group of consumers on streaming services is 
young people between 15 and 25 years old. Today’s situation favors labels with large 
catalogues because the payment for every stream is very small. When more 
consumers shift to streaming, the picture may become different. There may also 
emerge new profit sharing models that make streaming more profitable for niche 
artists.  
 
Majors’ position is protected by their catalogue, but only temporary. Waldfogel 
(2011) demonstrates that music consumers have a preference towards new music. 
They would eventually have to renew their catalogue in order to fit the preferences of 
a younger audience. The number of releases from major labels in 2012 is almost half 
the level in 2000. As the catalogue depreciates, independent labels can have better 
chances of gaining a larger market share.  
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When a label undertakes an investment, it has to balance the choice between 
investing in process innovations and product innovations. Labels can more easily 
gain profits from process innovations, but product innovations are necessary to 
position the label in order to gain from process innovations in the future. What 
would have been interesting to study is the investment behavior of major labels in 
the long run, and the ratio between product and process innovations. If the ratio of 
process innovations to product innovations has increased, it means that major labels 
benefit more from old content. If they innovate less today, it means that their 
position may be threatened by independent labels in the future if independent labels 
manage to build up a successful music catalogue.  
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The thesis is written as a part of the double degree master program within the time 
limitation of six months. In order to limit the scope of the thesis, I have chosen to 
concentrate on the relationship between market structure and innovation in the 
record industry. There is an increasing number of studies on the relationship 
between market structure and incentive to innovate because there is no linear 
relationship. Firms’ heterogeneity makes it difficult to draw a general conclusion on 
how market structure affects the incentives to innovate. I have used an 
unconventional method to define and to measure innovation, but it allowed me to 
look into an area that others have not researched before. The thesis is limited to the 
Norwegian record industry. The Norwegian market is relatively small compared to 
other countries. Results from the thesis can therefore not directly be generalized to 
other markets. However, the small size has given me the chance to interview with 
some of the most central persons in the industry. I assume that the general effects of 
digitization of the record industry have similar effect on the Norwegian industry as in 
other western countries. I did not get the chance to interview an independent label. 
This would have given me the opportunity to get a more balanced picture of the 
industry. 
 
I had very little empirical data on the market structure. With more variables, the 
empirical research could be strengthened. Furthermore, innovation was defined as 
either process innovation or product innovation using a dichotomous variable. Only 
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allowing for two options increases the threat of painting a black and white picture of 
innovation in the industry when there may be other options available. One example 
is “Best of” albums. They may be album compilations of several artists. They are 
definitely process innovations, but they cannot be allocated to any specific artist. The 
reasoning is the same for the categorization of labels. The major labels are relatively 
equal, but the independent labels vary significantly in size and characteristics. A 
better measure could be market shares. This was not possible to measure, because I 
did not have access to sales data. 
 
I have not included copyright. The general textbook model on patent protection and 
incentives to innovate says that stronger patent protection increase the incentives to 
innovate, as it generates more profits to the innovator because of the temporary 
monopoly power given to the innovator. File sharing has decreased the strength of 
copyright, and according to theory, supply of music should therefore decrease. It has 
not, and this relationship in the perspective of market structure could be looked into 
in future research. 
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This thesis has laid a foundation for future research on innovation in the music 
industry. It touches several areas that can be further researched. First, the empirical 
research can be strengthened with more independent variables. Genre has possibly 
an effect, as independent labels may be genre specific. Second, the effect new albums 
have on sales of old content is interesting. This effect can be related to other markets, 
such as the e-book market. Third, an area I did not touch upon, but which is a 
natural part of the debate on incentives to innovate is intellectual property. With an 
increasing number of DJs and remixes, do remixes increase the surplus of the remix 
and the original song, or does the copyright decrease the surplus for both the DJ and 
the rights-holder? Fourth, Joel Waldfogel demonstrates in the article “Free entry and 
social inefficiency in Radio broadcasting” that free entry leads to social inefficiency. 
Is the effect the same in the music industry? Fifth, what is the effect of 
recommendation systems through social media on music consumption?  
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8 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I study how market structure can explain the incentives to innovate in 
the Norwegian music industry. Product innovation is defined as investments in new 
artists that possess a set of characteristics that differentiates he or she from the 
existing artists in the market. Process innovation is defined as investments in 
subsequent album releases of an artist. Since a subsequent album release increases 
the size of the market as well as the sales of the old catalogue through streaming 
services, it generates the same effect as a process innovation defined under Cournot 
with a change in marginal cost, although I assume marginal cost is constant. A 
product innovation gives the opportunity to benefit from subsequent process 
innovations, which is needed for the label to recoup the investment of the product 
innovation. By using a logistic regression, I show that independent labels invest two 
times more than major labels in product innovations.  
 
The music industry is an oligopoly with four large labels and thousands of 
independent labels. Technology has decreased the barriers to entry in the industry, 
which has led to an increase in the number of artists and labels. Independent labels 
account for the increase in yearly music releases, as major labels have decreased 
their output. Nevertheless, the four major labels seem to have kept their market 
share stable. Streaming services have forced artists to compete in quantity, creating 
competitive advantage for labels with large catalogues. This makes it tougher for 
niche artists and small artists to compete on streaming platforms, as streaming has 
increased the importance of economies in scale. Major labels are in a better position 
to undertake process innovations because of their existing catalogue, access to capital 
and research capabilities. On the other hand, this may limit their ability to find new 
innovative artists, which may be why independent labels account for more product 
innovations than major labels. 
 
The objective for all labels is to release a product in the market with an innovative 
sound. The major labels will benefit from the first innovation by releasing multiple 
subsequent process innovations that allow them to benefit from diminishing cost. 
The independent label will release the first album, but cannot compete in the market 
for the second album because of lack of capital, less access to promotion channels 
and a small existing music catalogue. Competition in process innovations is too 
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intense, so the independent labels will therefore continue to compete in product 
innovations by targeting the subculture and re-segmenting their portion of the 
market while major labels reap the larger benefits from process innovations, which 
maintains their market share. 
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10 Appendices 
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6YYYZ6Y-6&
O4J#%3&
6YYTZ6Y-6&
Q$#4J,&'*&
EV&R:,+"&
@"$%,[&
@400%,,&3"+%&
Q>%3"2%&
"$#4J&3"+:'&
<=>?@A! 412! 341! 2-! 31.02!B! 0.43-!
C8%$#*'D;! 15/! 303! -/! 11.--!B! +./0+!
E)8F! 122! +2/! -1! 1,./5!B! +.-+5!
@GH! 35-! 52! 41! 25.11!B! +.-20!
CIJ@A<!AK"EI!
L>M<@G@"I@!
31/! 1-! 4! ++.++!B! 0.331!
N"MLLM!"@OK"?E!
PAK"EIQ!
31+! +-3! 10! +/.23!B! 0.-,4!
EHGMR! +/4! /5! ++! +3.-4!B! 0.250!
?M6K"IE! +55! +45! +5! ++.2-!B! 0.32-!
6D*8#*! +4,! 5,! 14! 41.04!B! +./-2!
>=AK"! +4-! 40! 5! +5.20!B! 0.,32!
G<N!PAK"EIQ! +3,! +0,! +3! ++.0+!B! +.1/,!
IH"I@>HN!
IC><C"S@"IE<@?!
+35! ,5! 3+! 3+.-2!B! +.++1!
<M>HI! ++5! ,3! 4! 4.12!B! +.335!
"CA@!N"MGGKTKA! ++2! /3! +-! +,.2+!B! 0.-0,!
U@H>K!PAK"EIQ! ++3! -4! 5! +0.,4!B! 0.-22!
3>! +0/! --! -! ,.0,!B! 0.304!
UK<!O>CV!"@OK"?E!
PAK"EIQ!
+0-! 33! 3! ,.0,!B! 0.+2/!
GME<@"!GCEHO! +01! 22! -! +0.,+!B! 3.-54!
AK"O?! +03! 50! 1! 4.3,!B! 0.0,,!
@<AHEI!GCEHII>CVV! +00! 51! 3! 3.54!B! 0.353!
OC">HAN!>@NE!
L"K?CO<HKAE!
PAK"EIQ!
/,! 11! 5! 3+.3+!B! 0./32!
TK"WR!PAK"EIQ! //! 3+! 2! 31./+!B! 0.1-/!
AK"?HO!"@OK"?E! /5! 2,! 5! ++./-!B! 0.+++!
OOML! /4! -0! 1! 2.00!B! 0.2-2!
OKEGKE! /4! 1/! +-! 43.++!B! +./20!
HA?H@!"@OK"?HANE! /4! /1! 3-! 1+.11!B! 0.23,!
V@M<E@"SHO@! /1! 15! 1! /.++!B! 0.+-/!
JMXX>MA?!
"@OK"?HANE!
/+! 43! +3! 3/.25!B! 0.+/3!
SKHO@E!KT!6KA?@"!
PAK"EIQ!
/+! -/! +/! 3-.45!B! 0.135!
EGM>><K6A!
ECL@"EKCA?!
55! 2+! ,! +5.-2!B! 0.112!
GCEHO!VCEHA@EE! 53! -3! 13! 2+.-+!B! 0.,3,!
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VHN!VKR!"@OK"?E! 4-! 44! ++! 32.00!B! +.0/2!
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"MOHAN!JCAHK"! 40! +3! /! --.-5!B! +.1+/!
?M<!PEMGHEIQ! 1,! 10! 0! 0.00!B! YAZM!
V@"N@A!?HNH<M>!
E<C?HK!
1/! 30! 0! 0.00!B! YAZM!
V>C@!GKK?! 1/! 31! 4! +5.1,!B! 0.122!
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#N/A signifies labels without any albums on the hit list. 
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-Y.6 QHH%*5:XME"3:"#$%,
Variable Symbol Description Source
Title Title of thealbum Gramo
Artist Artist or band Gramo
Label Labelthat releasedthealbum Gramo
Mother label Non-subsidiarymajorlabel Gramo
Dummymajor 1=Major label,0=independent
Year Calendaryear Gramo
Numberin line Album numberof theartist Generated
Dummyprocess/product 1=product innovation;
0=processinnovation
Generated
VG-lista 1=listed;0=not listed Lista.vg.no
VG-score Compositescorebasedupon
the rankingon the hit-list aswell
asthenumberof weekslisted
Generated
Reviewed_dummy 1=reviewedin newspaper;0=no
Review Reviewscoreby newspaper;
rangesfrom 1 to 10
Youpopular
-Y.6.- )8: @\4"3%+%,+('3 H3'540+>%3,4,H3'540+:**'>"+:'*
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-Y.; QHH%*5:XM)'33%$"+:'*#%+P%%*>"3:"#$%,
-Y.;.- )'33%$"+:'*#%+P%%*+8%,0'3%'* EVZ$:,+""*5 +8%3%>:%P,0'3%
-Y.;.6 )'33%$"+:'* #%+P%%*EVZ$:,+"54JJ C"*5 3%>:%P54JJC
Correlation between VG-lista dummy and Review dummy
-Y.? QHH%*5:X! Z+%,+#%+P%%*H3'0%,,:**'>"+:'*, "*5 H3'540+:**'>"+:'*,
.
Pr( T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(| T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr( T > t) = 0.0000
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 7993
diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 9.1474
diff .2192308 .0239666 .17225 .2662115
combined 7995 .4682927 .005581 .4990248 .4573524 .4792329
1 455 .2615385 .0206255 .4399563 .2210052 .3020717
0 7540 .4807692 .0057543 .4996632 .4694892 .4920492
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Dummyprocessproduct, by(label_type)
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-Y.L QHH%*5:XM7%23%,,:'*"*"$C,:,
-Y.L.- 7%23%,,:'*'( +8%+CH%'( :**'>"+:'* ", 5%H%*5%*+>"3:"#$%
#B"D"#"#E.%@0,.8(AA('/&A'&(AA0'0(,/)
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-Y.L.66*5 7%23%,,:'*'( +8%+CH%'( :**'>"+:'* ", 5%H%*5%*+>"3:"#$%
-Y.L.; 7%23%,,:'*]\4"$:+C(:$+%3%5$:,+
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-Y.T QHH%*5:X&B*+%3>:%P&24:5%&
Intervjuguide for majorselskaper 
 
Disposisjon: 
1. Introduksjon: Litt om meg og bakgrunn for valg av oppgaven 
2. Forklare hvordan jeg ønsker å bruke dataene og hva jeg kommer til å måle 
3. Intervju: Forklare struktur på intervjuet 
 
Ønsker i oppgaven å se på hvorvidt det er noe forskjell mellom 
investeringsmønsteret til store plateselskap eller små plateselskap. Hva vektlegger 
små selskaper, og hva vektlegger de store. 
 
Markedet 
1. Hvordan er markedet for å utgi nye album i dag? 
• Hvor stor andel av albumlanseringene kommer fra nye artister fremfor 
katalogartister? 
 
Selskapet 
2. Har selskapet noe spesielt sjangerfokus? 
3. Hvordan jobber dere med å finne nye artister? 
4. Hvilke tjenester tilbyr dere til artistene (booking, mm) 
5. Hvilke funksjoner har dere i selskapet? Hva gjør dere selv, hva outsourcer dere? 
6. Hvordan ser en artistkontrakt ut?  
• Er det forskjeller på re-signering av artister eller ny-signering? 
• Hvor lange kontrakter har dere med artister? 
7. Hvor lenge jobber dere med en artist? 
9. Hvilke format slipper dere ut musikk på? 
- Er det noen endring hvorvidt dere satser på singler/album kontra tidligere? 
10. I forhold til streaming, hvilke aldersgruppe er mest aktive? 
11. Hvordan måler dere suksessfaktor for artister eller album/singel? 
12. Hvilke av deres artister, nye eller gamle, streames mest/selges mest? 
Katalogartister eller unge nye? 
13. Hva har musikkanmeldelser å si for utgivelsene? 
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14. Hvilke ekstra tjenester får artister av å bruke et label kontra å slippe albumet 
selv? 
15. Hvilke fordeler har man ved et majorselskap kontra et indieselskap? 
Musikkplattform og distribusjon 
16. Vil man konvergere mot én plattform, eller vil man ha flere plattformer? Er 
dagens plattformer de fremtidig gjeldende plattformene? 
17. Spillelister har fått større fotfeste. Hvilken påvirkning har dette på salg av musikk 
og satsningen på nye artister? (er det forskjellig avhengig av sjanger?) 
 
Innovasjon 
18. Hvordan vil du definere innovasjon blant plateselskaper?  
19. Hvem vil du si er de største driverne for innovasjon i bransjen? 
20. Når i stadiet investerer plateselskapet i en artist? Før de har hatt utgivelse eller 
etter første release? 
21. Long tail prinsippet til John Anderson sier jo at det vil være et marked for nisjene 
fordi etterspørselen vil øke siden de plutselig blir gjort tilgjengelig for alle. Samtidig 
sier man at volum er den primære driveren for å overleve i streamingverdenen. 
Hvilken av disse motsetningene er det Anderson ikke har forstått? 
22. Hva gjør selskapet for å holde seg oppdatert på ny musikk? Om man ser på ny 
musikk som innovasjon i bransjen 
23. Hva koster det å produsere en låt, et album? Er det dyrere i dag enn for 10 år 
siden? 
 
 
 
